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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The Admission Avoidance Programme Board was set up in April 2013. Its remit was to identify and 
implement a range of community-based resources that could reduce emergency admissions by 
5,000 finished consultant episodes, (pro-rata), across the winter pressures period (October 2013 to 
March 2014). Four projects were identified and planned; the Contact Centre, Rapid Response Teams, 
Enhanced Community Teams and Ambulatory Emergency Care. Funding was made available from 
the Marginal Resource Tariff (MRT) and ‘Readmission’ monies to ensure initial implementation. The 
non-recurring MRT monies have now come to an end. If the projects are to continue as a community 
resource, further funding will need to be provided from Lincolnshire CCGs and the three providers. 
To support these funding decisions, a necessarily limited evaluation was carried out to assess the 
effectiveness of the projects over their short-term of operation. The evaluation addressed two 
questions: 
 
1. Does the scheme contribute to discernible, (real and tangible) quantifiable reduction in 
acute emergency admissions? 
2. Does the scheme represent value for money when benchmarked against the cost of an acute 
admission? 
 
Three of the four projects have been included in the evaluation (the Contact Centre, Rapid Response 
Teams and Ambulatory Emergency Care Units). A combination of methods were used: rapid 
literature reviews (where evidence was available); semi-structured interviews with strategic and 
operational staff; process mapping exercises; assessment of costs; non-participant observation; 
statistical process control and secondary quantitative analysis across a range of datasets.  
 
THE CONTACT CENTRE 
The Contact Centre became operational on 18 November 2013 and since that time has received a 
total of 5,316 calls. There has been a five per cent increase in calls month-on-month from January 
2014, with an 11 per cent greater call volume between December 2013 and March 2014. Referrals 
are received from organisations across the health and social care economy; a third of calls made by 
secondary care, with over one in ten received from General Practitioners (GPs). East Midlands 
Ambulance Service (EMAS) is yet to fully engage with this resource; their reluctance perhaps 
reflecting the early implementation difficulties. The total reported cost of the Contact Centre 
including project management costs across the five months of implementation is £385,606 with the 
total cost per call received (including set-up costs) of £73.  
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It is recommended that the Contact Centre is continued. If the Lincolnshire county-wide health and 
social care economy is to be appropriately managed, admissions avoided and high quality services 
provided to patients at the right place and time; a capacity management system is essential. 
 
RAPID RESPONSE TEAMS 
The Rapid Response Teams (RRT) in Lincoln, Grantham, Boston and Louth were planned to be 
operational from 18 November 2013, ensuring greater community capacity to treat and support the 
patient in their own home. It was identified that each RRT should operate 24 hours across seven 
days a week and would encompass a range and mix of skills; an Emergency Care or Advanced Nurse 
practitioner (Band 7); a Mental Health Nurse (Band 6), a Nurse (Band 5) and six generic health care 
support workers (Band 3). This planned structure was and is being affected by the system difficulties 
of the Admissions Avoidance Programme. The Lincoln team would seem to be fully staffed and 
operate extended hours between 8am and 10pm. Not all numbers of staff envisaged in Boston and 
Louth could be appointed before notice of the recruitment freeze (December 2013). The Boston and 
Louth RRTs have joined together ensuring greater capacity and five day a week support. However, 
compared with the Lincoln Team they are operating more limited hours, 9am – 5pm. 
 
Over the period of implementation, the total number of referrals received across the different teams 
is 621. These have increased month on month by almost two-thirds; a 59 per cent increase between 
December 2013 and March 2014. The majority of referrals are received from GPs with paramedics 
yet to re-engage with the Contact Centre following the challenges of implementation and/ or trust 
that the RRTs will have the capacity to deliver the necessary service. The majority of patients are 
being managed in the community with fewer than 15 per cent of patients admitted to acute care. 
From data collated by the Lincoln RRT, the mean age of the patient assessed is 82 with almost the 
total population (89%) aged 70 and over. Over three-quarters of patients (77%) received one day’s 
care, with only one in ten requiring three or more days support. A number of face-to-face visits were 
necessary across one or more days to ensure the patient could be appropriately supported at home. 
The cost per patient over the period of implementation (and including the average of three face-to-
face visits) is £547. These figures compare favourably with the average cost per patient reported by 
other rapid response teams; £954 (Curtis, 2013). If the yearly referral rate of 2,952 patients is 
achieved and admissions continue to be avoided in the (conservative estimate) of 51 per cent of 
cases, a total of £526,932 could be saved in acute care. 
 
It is recommended that the Rapid Response Teams are continued. Patients receive a higher quality 
of care if they can be supported in their own home and the teams have demonstrated an early 
reduction in admissions. 
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AMBULATORY EMERGENCY CARE 
Three Ambulatory Emergency Care (AECs) units were set up across ULHT; at Lincoln County Hospital 
(LCH), Pilgrim Hospital (PHB) and Grantham and District Hospital (GDH). Each unit has a slightly 
different model of care delivery, although all have developed a range of ambulatory care pathways 
e.g., Pulmonary Embolism, Cellulitis, Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.  
 
The AEC at Lincoln have seen a total of 1,600 patients; PHB have seen and treated 1,206 patients, 
whilst GDH operated a slightly different model, seeing on average between two and three patients a 
day. To explore further the likely age ranges, diagnoses and pathway of patients attending the ULHT 
AEC units, we drew on the first 600 patient records collated by LCH AEC unit. Over a third of patients 
were either under or over 65 with a mean age of 53 years. Just under a fifth of patients were 
admitted at the weekend. Almost two-thirds of the patients were referred to the AEC from A&E with 
a further third being referred by the GP. Older people (aged 65 and over) were more likely to be 
admitted to the Lincoln AEC unit later in the day, which may have an impact on capacity during these 
times. From our analysis it would seem that a third of patients (34%, 203) were admitted to the 
Lincoln AEC unit to avoid the A&E four hour breach. Patients were more likely to be admitted if they 
were older and had attended in the months of November and December 2013. Such admissions may 
also have an impact on the unit’s admission criteria or capacity. Alternatively, this may simply be an 
artefact of the early implementation of the AEC. That is, whilst appropriate GP and A&E referrals 
were being built up, further capacity was available to support the A&E department. A number of 
positive outcomes stemmed from the operation of the Lincoln AEC unit. GP admissions were 
prevented in almost a fifth of cases (18%) and almost the total sample (93%) required no follow-up.  
 
The total cost per patient per annum will be £197. Non-cashable savings can be generated. If GP 
admissions continue to be prevented in 18 per cent of the cases, savings of over half a million 
pounds per annum could be available. If the estimated proportion of avoided admissions is 
continued, (79% of patients discharged home), a £2,227,750 non-cashable saving may be possible.  
 
It is recommended that the AEC units are continued across ULHT. Such units are a core part of future 
urgent care policy and practice. In particular, each unit has demonstrated early ability to diagnose, 
treat and discharge in the same-day time frame; reducing bed-days and longer-term lengths of stay. 
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SECONDARY QUANTATIVE ANALYSIS 
Data was received from the Greater East Midlands Commissioning Support Unit (GEMCSU) that 
detailed all emergency admissions from April 2012 to March 2014. Our initial analyses of these data 
using statistical process control (SPC) and run charts, focused on ULHT provision (LCH, PHB and 
GDH). A further analysis using descriptive statistics and logistical regression was then carried out to 
explore further any observed changes found in the SPC charts. To ensure any impact of the projects 
could be evaluated, two time periods were compared; October 2012 to February 2013 and October 
2013 to February 2014. 
 
No change was found in the monthly emergency admissions for ULHT. Emergency bed-days fell in 
the second winter period from 6.55 to 6.28. Older people are more likely to use a greater number of 
bed-days; those aged 80 – 90 are five and a half times more likely to use between 1 and 100 bed-
nights. Patients with an ASCS flag are also one and a half times more likely to use a greater number 
of bed-nights. The proportion of ASCS ‘flagged’ emergency admissions fell 0.6 per cent and the 
proportion of readmissions was seemingly reduced by 1.3 per cent. There was a statistically 
significant change in zero bed nights. These increased from 5,050 to 5,482, an 8.65 per cent increase, 
representing 21.7 (Oct 2012 – Feb 2013) and 24.28 per cent (Oct 2013 – Feb 2014) of overall bed-
nights. For those patients who need to be readmitted within 30 days, proportionally fewer patients 
are staying either seven or more bed-nights. In exploring those months in the two winter periods 
when there may have been a reduction in bed-nights, the months of December 2012 and the period 
November 2013 to February 2014 demonstrated a statistically significant reduction. 
 
IMPACT OF THE ADMISSION AVOIDANCE PROGRAMME 
We found no demonstrable changes in the monthly emergency admissions for ULHT. Quantifiable 
reductions were found across two other measures; numbers of bed-nights and zero lengths of stay. 
The month of December 2012 and the period November 2013 to February 2014 showed statistically 
significant reductions. In the latter time-period, only 20 winter expansion beds were opened. In 
comparison, in the same period last year (October 2012 – February 2013) over 100 winter expansion 
beds were necessary.  
 
The short-term nature of this evaluation has not enabled a full cost-effectiveness analysis to be 
undertaken. The data presented can only explore the cost per patient (or referral) of each service. 
Each service would seem to demonstrate value for money when benchmarked against the cost of an 
acute admission. The per annum unit costs of calls to the Contact Centre is £67 whilst the total 
annual cost per patient referred to the Rapid Response team may be as low as £264. The unit cost 
for treating patients at the Ambulatory Emergency Care Units is almost half the cost of a bed-day; 
£197.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
THE ADMISSION AVOIDANCE PROGRAMME 
The Admission Avoidance Programme Board was set up in April 2013. Its remit was to identify and 
implement a range of community-based resources that could reduce emergency admissions by 
5,000 finished consultant episodes, (pro-rata), across the winter pressures period (October 2013 to 
March 2014). The programme board included senior strategic and operational managers from the 
Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) and three providers across Lincolnshire; United Lincolnshire 
Hospital Trust (ULHT), Lincolnshire Community Health Services (LCHS) and Lincolnshire Partnership 
Foundation Trust (LPFT). Four projects were identified and planned; the Contact Centre, Rapid 
Response Teams, Enhanced Community Teams and Ambulatory Emergency Care. Funding was 
made available from the Marginal Resource Tariff (MRT) and Readmission monies to ensure initial 
implementation.  
 
THE EVALUATION 
The non-recurring MRT monies have now come to an end. If the projects are to continue as a 
community resource, further funding will need to be provided from the Lincolnshire CCGs, as well as 
the three providers. To support such decisions around funding and to assess the effectiveness of the 
projects over their short-term of operation (November 2012 to March 2013); the Community and 
Health Research Unit at the University of Lincoln were requested to carry out a limited evaluation. 
The evaluation was commissioned on 30th March 2013 to address the following key questions:  
 
1. Does the scheme contribute to discernable, (real and tangible) quantifiable reduction in 
acute emergency admissions? 
2. Does the scheme represent value for money when benchmarked against the cost of an acute 
admission? 
 
In carrying out this evaluation, we have recognised the high profile and ambitious nature of the 
Admission Avoidance programme and the need for the evaluation to produce robust and credible 
outputs. However, there were a range of challenges that faced the evaluation in terms of its 
complexity, timeframe (eight weeks) and the wide range of different interventions that were 
implemented, each within a different local context. In particular, the projects were still in the early 
stages of implementation; placing limitations on the extent to which their outcomes could be 
measured  
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This on-going evolution or project ‘churn’ was particularly relevant in the case of the enhanced 
community teams, known as the Independent Living Team -Health (ILT Health) and the Independent 
Living Team - Support (ILT Support). The former involves a range of nurses and therapists and the 
latter, home-care or reablement staff. At the beginning of the evaluation (1 April), ILT Support staff 
were TUPE’d from Lincolnshire Adult Social Care to LPFT, with the consequent change of job 
descriptions, workload and responsibilities. It was therefore decided to exclude this team from our 
evaluation.  
 
It was also requested that the evaluation incorporate a critical analysis of the internal evaluations of 
two further projects, both funded through ‘Winter Pressures’ money. The Hospital Intensive 
Psychiatric Service (HIPS) at Lincoln County Hospital (LCH) was managed by LPFT; whilst the 
Prevention of Admission Community Team Service (PACT) was developed and implemented by a 
third sector organisation, Adults Supporting Adults. The critical appraisal of these evaluations can be 
found in the appendix of this report. 
 
To evaluate the ‘direction of travel’ of the Contact Centre, Rapid Response Teams and Ambulatory 
Emergency Care, a combination of methods have been used: rapid literature reviews; semi-
structured interviews with strategic and operational staff (n=22); process mapping exercises (n=2); 
non-participant observation; assessment of costs; statistical process control (SPC) analysis and 
secondary quantitative analysis across a range of datasets. In carrying out the rapid literature 
reviews, evidence was available for two of the three projects. Despite using a range of search-terms, 
no existing peer-reviewed evidence could be found that provided a wider context or further 
guidance for the Contact Centre. Across each of the projects, cost-data has been provided and an 
estimate made of the likely non-cashable acute savings available. The short-term nature of this 
evaluation has not enabled a full cost-effectiveness analysis to be undertaken. The data presented 
can only explore the cost per patient (or referral) of each service. We are unable to make 
estimations as to the wider cost to the health and social care economy. For example, many patients 
are managed in the community and referred onward to other services e.g., District Nurse, therapist 
or adult social care resources. As we were unable to ‘track’ patients, these costs could not be 
included. 
 
Prior to detailing the findings in this report, we first summarise those challenges faced by the 
Admission Avoidance programme board in identifying and planning the projects. The three project 
case studies are then presented as separate sections. Each includes outcomes from the wider 
evidence-base, process mapping, secondary analysis and cost data. Finally, analysis is presented that 
explores the changes in emergency admissions, bed-days, bed-nights and emergency readmissions 
across the two winter periods; October 2012 – February 2013 and October 2013 – February 2014. 
  
________________________________________________________________________________9 
 
 
 
 
ADMISSION AVOIDANCE PROGRAMME BOARD: CHALLENGES. 
 
The challenges faced by the representatives of the Admission Avoidance programme board are well-
known by the representatives and the wider CCGs and providers. It is unnecessary to present the full 
narrative account of these difficulties. The four core factors that have affected the extent and 
performance of the projects are simply summarised below. 
 
1. No needs or gap analysis was carried out to identify the type of projects that could achieve a 
reduction of 5,000 finished consultant episodes (pro-rata) across Lincolnshire. 
 
2. No base-line data was identified; collected or collated that could enable an exploration of 
any changes resulting from project implementation. 
 
3. Final decisions on available funding were made extremely late (October 2013) giving the 
projects a limited time-frame in which to recruit staff and develop robust policies and 
processes. 
 
4. The total funding agreed in October 2013 was reduced in December 2013. The consequence 
of this has been that projects have never operated to capacity; limiting what could be 
achieved.  
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THE CONTACT CENTRE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The Contact Centre is the central and essential 24 hour, seven day resource that enables 
unnecessary admissions to be appropriately avoided. It is staffed by teams of service advisors and 
nurse practitioners, each of whom take patient referrals from a range of clinicians, e.g., GPs, 
paramedics, secondary care nurses and social care staff. Using a computerised capacity management 
and disposition system – Cayder – Service Advisors or Nurse Practitioners deploy urgent (Rapid 
Response Team, ILT Health or Support) or longer-term services (District Nurse, Adult Social Care 
brokerage) to support the patient in their own home. No literature was available to provide the 
wider context or support any likely future outcomes of the Contact Centre.  
 
IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS 
It was envisaged that a single point of access (SPA) would be set up to manage clinical referrals, 
service capacity and staff deployment. Clinicians contacting the SPA to refer patients at risk of 
admission would have immediate access to a range of urgent or longer-term community based 
services; ensuring management of their patient ‘closer to home’. Lincolnshire Partnership 
Foundation Trust (LPFT) was to lead the development and implementation of the SPA, building on 
their existing infrastructure; a mental health appointment booking system.  
 
During this early planning phase, a number of concerns were highlighted. It was recognised that in 
the majority of calls, clinicians would require urgent support to manage physical health, rather than 
mental health, needs. An initial suggestion was that LPFT call-handlers would carry out onward 
referrals of such patients to community-based resources managed by Lincolnshire Community 
Health Services (LCHS). This proposed pathway was perceived as unlikely to appropriately manage 
risk, patient safety or governance responsibilities (Interview 05). There were also seeming limitations 
to the SPA proposed by LPFT. The system already in operation and that would form the core of any 
development, was an appointment booking, rather than capacity management, system. It was 
recognised that if emergency admissions were to be avoided, a system and structure needed to be in 
place that could; enable calls to be triaged by an available clinician, identify appropriate services and 
carry out timely deployment of staff to ensure the patient at risk of admission could be supported at 
home. Following further discussions across LPFT and LCHS, it was decided that the existing mental-
health SPA would remain, whilst a further capacity management system, the Contact Centre, would 
be developed, implemented and managed by LCHS. 
 
The decision to move from a single point of access to two separate systems was agreed in the middle 
of October 2013 and it was expected that the Contact Centre would be ‘live’ from November. The 
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Contact Centre programme managers had four weeks to: identify, design and implement the 
computer and telephony support system; recruit staff, assess and plan for likely demand; and 
develop patient pathways, referral protocols or ‘scripts’ for the non-clinical and clinical call staff. By 
necessity, many of the processes were set up following the Contact Centre becoming operational on 
18 November, 2013, “I think it’s called reverse engineering without a map” (Process mapping 
exercise). The limited implementation time-frame had a negative impact on the initial performance 
of the Contact Centre. The extent of demand on day one, (200 calls), led to staff being unable to 
provide or deploy the support community-based clinicians were requesting. The initial consequence 
was that paramedics and GPs simply disengaged from the service. 
 
Intensive development work over the initial months of operation (November to January) has 
ensured robust processes and pathways are now in place. In response, the numbers of referrals from 
GPs are now slowly increasing, although paramedics have yet to re-engage.  
 
EXISTING PROCESS AND ACTIVITY 
A process mapping exercise was carried out with Contact Centre staff; service advisors, clinical team 
leaders, nurses and the social care representative. Participants were asked to map the process they 
follow the majority (i.e., 80%) of the time from beginning to end. The final maps are provided as a 
further attachment alongside this report. 
 
EXISTING PROCESS 
Incoming calls are answered by an automated system prompting the caller to select from one of 
three options: option 1 is for patients or members of the public seeking information or advice; 
option 2 for those wishing to arrange patient transport or a visit from a District Nurse (DN); whilst 
option 3 manages referrals to the Rapid Response Team or services provided by Independent Living 
Health (e.g., community bed, physiotherapy, occupational therapy) and Support (re-ablement 
services). The mapping session focussed on options 2 and 3 only. 
OPTION 2 
Service Advisors are responsible for arranging DN visits and Lace Community Service transport for 
those patients registered with GPs in North West Lincolnshire. Clinicians calling on behalf of patients 
registered outside this geographical area are signposted to other providers.  
 
When arranging for a DN visit, the Service Advisors will ask for relevant details and complete a 
paper proforma. The referrer will be asked to provide their name and contact details along with that 
of their patient including: home and discharge address; diagnosis or symptoms; and required 
onward care and treatment. The completed proforma is faxed through to the appropriate DN team 
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or GP practice, and filed with the facsimile receipt. If a same-day visit has been arranged, the Service 
Advisor will also telephone the DN and leave a message. This predominantly paper-based process 
takes Service Advisors between fifteen to 60 minutes to complete.  
 
This process is a change from what was originally proposed. It was initially envisaged that nurse 
practitioners would receive, triage and process those referrals requesting a visit from a DN. Owing to 
the number of calls and consequent limited nurse practitioner capacity; the Service Advisors now 
manage this part of the process. This change has raised wider concerns as to how effectively patient 
risk is being managed. Service Advisors are not clinically trained. They themselves expressed 
anxieties that during the referral process, they are not necessarily able to identify if the patient has 
an urgent need that may require an immediate and different pathway of care. 
 
In receiving requests for Lace Transport, Service Advisors will ask the referrer a number of questions 
around the patient’s age, level of mobility and physical requirements to determine whether the 
patients meet the referral criteria. They will also ask what time the patient is to be collected to 
assess if transportation will be available during the necessary time-frame. Lace transport is only 
available within certain specified hours and these vary across the County. If the patient does not 
meet the referral criteria, e.g., s/he requires bariatric or hyperbaric care or transportation is needed 
outside the hours of operation, the Service Advisor will signpost the caller to another service 
provider. A paper proforma is then completed. The Lace transport team will then be telephoned and 
the Service Advisor will verbally provide the necessary patient information. If the Lace team 
contacted are unable to accept the request, the Service Advisor will try another team before calling 
the referrer back and signposting the referrer to another service provider (e.g., NSL). If the referral is 
received outside of Lace contracted hours, the form will be filed and dealt with at a later date or 
time. If patient is bariatric, an ambulance is arranged from another service provider although this 
necessitates six weeks’ notice.  
 
OPTION 3 
When the caller selects option 3 they are automatically diverted to the Nurse Practitioner team. If a 
nurse is unavailable, the call will be answered by a Service Advisor, who will take the referrer’s 
contact details, patient’s name, diagnosis and care requested, beginning the patient registration on 
Systmone. The nursing team will then be tasked to call the referrer. 
 
PROCESS OF REFERRAL TO THE INDEPENDENT LIVING TEAM, HEALTH AND SUPPORT. 
Patients’ can be referred to the Independent Living Team (ILT) for a variety of reasons. The patient 
may need short-term respite support or health care offered through a community based hospital, 
care home or nursing home. Alternatively they may need a range of care to support them in their 
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own home, mitigating any admission; e.g., reablement (home care) or rehabilitation (occupational 
therapy or physiotherapy). 
 
If the referrer is requesting a respite or ‘30-day’ bed, the nurse will take the necessary details and 
register the referral on Systmone, completing relevant sections of the screening tool. Available 
capacity will then be assessed via Cayder, or from a list that is compiled daily by the Service Advisors. 
The referrer will then be provided with details and asked to contact the residential or nursing care 
home if and when the home is deemed to have capacity to accept the referral; that is, the ‘RAG’ 
(Red, Amber, Green) status is green. The patient’s registration on Systmone will be printed and faxed 
to the home. If the level of capacity is unknown, (i.e., ‘RAG’ status is red or amber), the nurse will 
first telephone the home to check current and possible later bed availability. Where there is no 
capacity, the referrer will be sign-posted to other service providers, such as Adult Social Care. 
Following this process, the patient’s registration record on Systmone will be updated accordingly. 
This process takes approximately 15 minutes to complete, but can take much longer when capacity 
is reduced. For example, in checking capacity, the nurse may have to telephone between 5 and 15 
residential or nursing care homes.  
 
On receiving a referral for ILT health’s Occupational or Physiotherapists, the nurse will obtain the 
relevant patient information that enables completion of all sections of the on-line screening form. 
The referrer is then placed on ‘hold’ whilst a phone call is made to the ILT health team to assess 
capacity. If the referral is accepted, this will be entered and tasked on Cayder. If not, the referrer will 
be provided with advice or sign-posted to other service providers (e.g. Age UK Falls Assessment 
Team or Adult Social Care). The patient referral record will then be updated on Systmone. The nurse 
practitioner team will continue to monitor, via Cayder, those accepted referrals to ensure ILT 
(Health) have confirmed and initiated care. This process takes between 15 minutes to just over an 
hour. 
 
When the caller is referring the patient for home or reablement support the nurse is required to 
move through a greater number of questions than required for other types of referrals. For example, 
before processing the referral, the information needed includes; the number of carers required, the 
level of support or number of calls per day, the time of day each call needs to be carried out and the 
date the service needs to be started. The nurse will record this information on Systmone, completing 
all sections (i.e., four pages) of the screening tool. The nurse will then identify the relevant ILT 
Support patch, check capacity via Cayder as well as by telephoning the relevant team. If the referral 
is accepted, the full screening tool on Systmone will be completed, saved into Portable Document 
Format (PDF) and attached to Cayder, before being assigned as a pending referral with the 
appropriate ILT support team. The patient record is then updated. The nurse will continue to 
monitor the referral via Cayder to ensure the service is started. If ILT Support staff are unable to 
accept the referral owing to capacity, the nurse may then telephone ILT Health to assess if a short-
term response can be provided. Receiving and arranging referrals for ILT Support takes 
approximately 15-35 minutes. 
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The time frames reported to complete each process are intended as a guide only. All referrals can 
take longer if the capacity of the team is unknown. ILT Health and Support teams have access to the 
Cayder system, but most fail to maintain a live ‘RAG’ status. This can simply be because members 
of the team forget to update their status. However, at times it would seem to be a way for ILT teams 
to manage the level and extent of dispositions. For example, if referrals have to be made by 
telephone rather than simply allocated via Cayder, the ILT team have a greater control over the 
number and type of patient’s accepted; thereby ensuring control of workload. To mitigate this, 
Contact Centre personnel telephone ILT teams and community hospitals each morning to check 
availability and RAG status. The information is collated and placed on a white board in the Contact 
Centre. The web-based capacity tool and Cayder system are then updated. The information is also 
disseminated via email to relevant individuals out in the patch, including ‘on-call’ officers.  
 
PROCESS OF REFERRAL TO THE RAPID RESPONSE TEAM (RRT)  
Calls will be accepted for patients who are to be referred to the RRT if they are at risk of hospital 
admission within 24 hours; if not, the caller will be signposted to another service provider. The 
nurse will register the referral on Systmone and check Cayder for the RRT capacity. Once the referral 
call has been completed, the nurse will telephone the RRT Assessor (Band 7 nurse) to pass on the 
relevant details. If the RRT Assessor is unable to accept the referral owing to a lack of capacity, the 
nurse will contact another RRT or Out-of-Hours team. If accepted, the referral will be tasked to the 
relevant RRT on Cayder and the patient record updated on Systmone. It takes between 45-90 
minutes from referral to arranging the necessary visit depending on whether the first RRT are able to 
accept or whether onward referral is required. 
 
ACTIVITY 
The Contact Centre has been providing collated data on a regular basis to strategic and operational 
staff. As part of this report we simply summarise their key activity data. The centre became 
operational on 18 November 2013 and since that time has received a total of 5,316 calls; rising 
incrementally across the time-frame of operation. There has been a five per cent increase in calls 
month-on-month from January 2014, with an 11 per cent greater call volume between December 
2013 and March 2014 (Table 1). 
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Table 1: Total calls received by the Contact Centre, November 2013 to March 2014. 
Month Total number of calls 
received 
November 190 
December 1223 
January 1231 
February 1303 
March 1369 
Totals 5316 
 
The reason for referral would seem to be relatively equally balanced between clinicians requesting 
immediate support to avoid likely emergency admissions (53%) and those calls requesting support 
for discharge (Table 2.) 
 
Table 2: Split of referral calls received by the Contact Centre, November 2013 to March 2014. 
Month Split of referrals 
Admission Avoidance, n (%) Supported discharge, n (%) 
November 142 (5) 48 (2) 
December 641 (22) 582 (24) 
January 604 (21) 627 (26) 
February 703 (24) 600 (25) 
March 787 (27) 582 (24) 
Totals 2877 (100) 2439 (100) 
 
Referrals are received from organisations across the health, social care and third sector economy 
(Table 3 and Figure 1). A third of calls are made by secondary care (33%), with over one in ten being 
received from GPs (15%). The number of calls being made by the Rapid Response Teams to ensure 
onward referral are only one per cent of total calls. However, as the capacity of the teams has 
increased, it can be seen that the levels of referrals between February and March 2014 have almost 
doubled. The lack of engagement by EMAS reflects the early implementation difficulties of the 
Contact Centre.  
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Table 3: Organisations referring to the contact centre, November 2013 to March 2014. 
Month EMAS GP Acute 
Hospital 
Ward 
A&E Community 
Hospital 
ASC - 
Community 
RRT Care 
Home 
Other Totals 
November 46 50 41 8 7 26 0 1 11 190 
December 75 158 441 59 141 158 2 15 174 1,223 
January 38 178 418 35 209 180 6 9 158 1,231 
February 26 221 419 49 180 208 17 13 170 1,303 
March 27 209 448 65 134 275 33 10 168 1,369 
Totals 212 816 1,767 216 671 847 58 48 681 5,316 
% call 
received 
4 15 33 4 13 16 1 1 13 100 
 
Figure 1: Organisations referring to the contact centre, November 2013 to March 2014. 
 
 
COSTS AND SET-UP COSTS 
 
The total reported cost of the Contact Centre including project management costs across eight 
months, set-up and staff costs across the five months of implementation is £385,606 (Table 4). 
Setting up a Contact Centre that can effectively manage capacity county-wide, diverting or avoiding 
admissions and readmissions, requires not only a range of IT equipment and telephony solutions, 
but demands a physical space from which to operate. It is not surprising that such costs total well 
over a third (43%) of spend to date. Similarly, the complexity of the intervention requires 
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appropriate programme and financial management, taking up almost a fifth of further costs (18%). 
The total cost per call received to date, including set up costs is £73.  
 
At this stage, it is difficult to estimate the annual costs of the Contact Centre. If no further 
development of the Centre is undertaken; a necessary programme manager is not appointed; the 
rate of calls continue to increase by 11 per cent every three months to 7,655; and existing staff are 
able to manage this increase (Table 5), the total cost per call reduces to £67. It should be noted that 
this cost does not include those monies necessary for continuing IT and telephony or staff 
recruitment or retraining. 
 
Table 4: Contact centre – set up and operational costs to March 2013. 
Contact Centre - set up and operational costs (£) 
Set-up costs (Project management) 
Project management (4 staff at 33% input, salary and on-costs x 8 
months) 
64,097 
Financial administration 5,764 
IT costs 119,000 
Workforce training 10,700 
Development of marketing materials 4,700 
Building refurbishment 42,000 
Telephony solutions 8,000 
Recruitment (HR costs) 7,200 
Total  261,461 
Operational staff costs (5 months plus on-costs) 
Admin Band 5 (1 WTE) 14,788 
Admin Band 3 (7.37 WTE) 74,538 
Nurse Band 6 (6.1 WTE) 22,689 
Social Care Coordinator (1 WTE) 12,130 
Total 124,145 
Total cost set-up and implementation  385,606 
 
Table 5: Annual staff costs and on-costs. 
Operational staff  Salary costs (£) On-costs (£) Total costs (£) 
Admin Band 5 (1 WTE) 33,908 3,300 37,208 
Admin Band 3 (7.37 WTE) 170,755.5 2,300 173,056 
Nurse Band 6 (6.1 WTE) 257,146 4,200 261,346 
Social Care Coordinator (1 WTE) 29,112  29,112 
Total (£) 490,921 9,800 500,721 
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FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONTACT CENTRE 
 
From the interviews with strategic staff and the process mapping exercise with operational staff, it 
would seem there are a number of future developments being considered. The Contact Centre’s 
ability to capacity manage and deploy services will be enhanced to appropriately facilitate 
discharges. On admission to the acute or community hospitals, a likely date of discharge would be 
entered into Cayder. The Contact Centre Service Advisors or nurses would then coordinate the 
necessary discharge, ensuring that transport and any discharge support service (e.g., ILT health, 
support or ASC brokerage) is organised. This would avoid any resources being unnecessarily 
deployed. For example, often hospital discharges are delayed, yet the home care or reablement 
team has already visited the patient on the original discharge date. Such a resource has been paid 
for yet not used, placing unnecessary pressure on an already cost and capacity limited system.  
 
Discussions are also underway to ensure that Cayder can be developed to ensure it can provide a 
county-wide capacity management system ‘our heat map of the whole capacity management for the 
whole health and social care economy’ (Interview 01). It will continue to show live data, enabling 
secondary and community care to appropriately manage demand.  
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
It is recommended the Contact Centre is continued. If the Lincolnshire county-wide health and social 
care economy is to be appropriately managed, admissions avoided and high-quality services 
provided to patients at the right place and time; a capacity management system is essential. 
There are a number of further recommendations that the Contact Centre, LCHS and Lincolnshire 
CCGs might wish to consider and discuss. 
 
1. It is strongly recommended that Cayder is enhanced to support discharges from hospital 
and community wards or departments. Placing a well-planned and agreed system in all 
hospitals will provide early facilitation around discharge planning, reducing the need for 
same-day transport and appropriately supporting patient’s at home, managing any 
readmissions. 
 
2. The processes and structures of the Contact Centre are still evolving. It is recommended 
that a project manager be appointed to ensure that developing practices are effective and 
efficient. 
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3. The increase in referrals to the Contact Centre is likely to result in a need for greater 
capacity. Consideration should be given to increase the number of Nurse Practitioners and 
their availability. As has been discussed, there may be patient risks or safety issues 
concerned with Service Advisors deploying clinical resources (e.g., District Nurses). 
 
4. Discussions and/ or further training needs to be undertaken with the wider community 
services to ensure the ‘RAG’ status on Cayder is appropriately updated. Reluctance or 
failure to maintain up-to-date capacity information inhibits and/or delays flow between 
services. Without such information, Service Advisors and Nurse Practitioners are required to 
telephone services direct, adding to their workload and further exacerbating capacity issues. 
 
5. The seeming unnecessary duplication of patient records (paper and electronic format) 
needs to be reduced.  
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RAPID RESPONSE TEAMS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The Rapid Response Teams (RRT) in Lincoln, Grantham, Boston and Louth were planned to be 
operational from 18 November 2013, ensuring greater community capacity to treat and support the 
patient in their own home. The initial scoping plans (the project initiation documents) stated that 
each RRT would operate 24 hours across seven days a week and would encompass a range and mix 
of skills: an Emergency Care or Advanced Nurse practitioner (Band 7); a Mental Health Nurse (Band 
6), a Nurse (Band 5) and six generic health care support workers (Band 3). This was a cross-provider 
initiative with mental health nurses and generic support workers being recruited and managed 
through LPFT, and nursing staff managed through LCHS. The four RRTs would receive referrals from 
the Contact Centre or Lincolnshire Out-of-Hours team. Following receipt of referral, the relevant RRT 
would assess the patient; providing treatment, support at home and onward referral as necessary. 
Members of the RRT would visit the patient within a two hour time-frame. The final operational 
structure, process and activity across the teams are discussed below. However, given the dynamic 
environment in which this evaluation has taken place, the final shape and activity of the RRTs may 
well have evolved further since reporting. 
 
EVIDENCE FROM THE LITERATURE 
Evaluation and assessment of Rapid Response teams fall within the overall literature around 
Intermediate Care and Hospital at Home (e.g., see Coad et al., 2013; Purdy, 2010; Smith et al., 2013; 
Young, 2009; Martin, 2004; Nancarrow et al., 2005; Allen, 2013; Wilson et al., 2007; Martin et al., 
2007; Pearson et al., 2007). In much of the literature, the term ‘rapid response team’ is used 
interchangeably with that of intermediate care. In this rapid review, no-one paper concentrated on 
exploring the impact of rapid response teams. These were included as part of intermediate care 
provision. Such foci of these papers are in part the result of the existing balance of services in 
intermediate care; most concentrate on supported discharge with less provision in place to ensure 
admissions can be avoided (Pearson et al., 2007). This limits the extent to which either positive or 
negative research findings can be applied to the structure, processes and outcomes of rapid 
response teams. 
DEFINITIONS AND MODELS 
An overarching definition of rapid response teams is that they aim to maintain ill people at home 
who would otherwise need to be admitted to hospital (Young et al., 2009). Their focus and operation 
can also be described by applying the definition of intermediate care: a short-term intervention to 
maintain the independence of people who might otherwise face unnecessarily prolonged hospital 
stays or inappropriate admission to hospital or residential care. The care provided is person-centred, 
focused on rehabilitation and delivered by a combination of professional groups. (Stevenson and 
Spenser, 2002). However, rapid response teams differ from intermediate care teams in that their 
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care is focused toward those individuals at immediate risk of hospital or residential care admission; 
they do not carry out supported discharge (Martin, 2004; Bowes et al., 2006). In short, they operate 
to avoid admissions, rather than support flow through secondary care (hospital) provision. Through 
time-limited compressive assessment, immediate treatment and (as necessary) referral onto longer 
term provision; rapid response teams can avoid unnecessary admissions. 
 
No one model of structures or processes would seem to be recommended. Teams have diverse 
service structures and hours of operation. Nursing is often the most commonly reported 
professional background for the team leader (Nancarrow et al., 2005) whilst a community health 
service most commonly hosts the team (Martin et al., 2007). Typically, rapid response teams are 
multidisciplinary (Griffiths et al., 2004; Parker 2006) likely to include input from physiotherapy, 
occupational therapy, therapy assistants (Anderson et al., 2013) and generic health care support 
workers (Young, 2009). Where the balance of staff is explored, it would seem that the proportion of 
support workers to professional qualified staff is approximately two to one (Nancarrow et al., 2005). 
The hours of operation are similarly varied. Of 33 intermediate care services explored by Nancarrow 
et al., 22 provided 24 hour, 7 day a week coverage, three services operated from 8am to 6pm, 7 days 
a week, whilst a further three only provided services across week-days. No-one paper discussed the 
appropriate case-load, although the timeframe of support was discussed; a structured intervention 
of active support provided for between 72 hours and six weeks (Martin, 2005; Philp et al., 2013).  
OUTCOMES AND TEAM CHARACTERISTICS 
Despite the lack of robust evidence on the skill-mix that should be available in any rapid response 
team, variations in team characteristics have been found to be associated with different service and 
patient outcomes. (Smith et al., 2013). Increasing the skill-mix in the team, raising the number of 
different types of staff by one, was associated with a 17 per cent reduction in service costs (Dixon et 
al., 2010). There may also be benefit to the patient’s health-related quality of life (as measured 
through EQ-5D) if a team has a higher ratio of support staff to qualified staff (Dixon et al., 2010). 
Such a finding is likely to be due to the length of time that support workers are able to interact with 
the patient, delivering any goal-orientated treatment plan. However, as other commentators note, 
an optimum number of qualified staff would still be necessary to assess patients, set-up the 
treatment plan, train non-qualified staff to deliver these and ensure appropriate onward referral 
(Smith et al., 2013).  
 
A number of team characteristics need to be in place if a RRT is to operate effectively. It is important 
that the team is able to ‘counteract status differences’ (Blewett et al., 2009). That is, horizontal 
relationships need to be built within the team, whilst on-going staff development and training will 
ensure opportunity and variation in those tasks undertaken by the differently skilled staff. Not 
surprisingly, teams that operated with the same core staff for a number of years were more likely to 
deliver improved patient outcomes (Batty, 2010). Reductions in readmission rates became greater 
over time as the team and the intervention became more embedded in the health and social care 
environment. However, such benefits bought about by length of ‘team-tenure’ would only continue 
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if an appropriate a ‘flat hierarchy’ and open communication was in place and team meetings could 
be held at least several times a week (McClimens et al., 2010; Ryviker et al., 2011). 
SECONDARY CARE OUTCOMES 
There is, as yet, no evidence on whether RRTs are effective in preventing hospital admissions (Purdy 
et al., 2010). One review that incorporated 10 trials (1,333 patients) found an upward trend in 
hospital admission during a three month follow-up, but this was a non-significant finding and there 
were no measures included as to whether these admissions were ‘inappropriate’ or unnecessary 
(Shepperd et al., 2008). It was also unclear from this review whether the models of services 
evaluated were similar to the RRT in operation across Lincolnshire. The availability of such teams 
within the health and social care economy do seem to reduce the number of readmissions. One 
systematic review of nurse-led teams compared with usual care for patients over 18 found that re-
admissions were reduced by around 50 per cent (Griffiths et al., 2007). There would also seem to be 
some tentative evidence that prior contact with staff of a rapid response team could reduce future 
bed-days (Allen, 2013). A Rapid Response service linked with a Smart Technology Programme, led to 
cost savings of £85,837 as a result of reduced bed-days (Bowes et al., 2006). These findings need to 
be treated with caution as few of the papers report the model, structure or process of the service 
being evaluated; limiting the applicability of the overarching intermediate care model to that of the 
RRT in Lincolnshire.  
MEASURING THE PATIENT EXPERIENCE  
There is little reporting around the user experience of rapid response teams; available data drawn 
from studies of either intermediate care or other types of interprofessional care teams (e.g., 
geriatric evaluation and management or ‘Hospital at Home’ models). In general, it would seem that 
users’ report high satisfaction, appreciating that treatment at home was favourable to hospital care 
(Regen et al., 2008; Corwin et al., 2005; Leff et al., 2006). Users’ also recognised that the services 
were able to be more flexible and deliver patient-centred care; supporting their own ‘recovery’ 
goals, e.g., the wish to maintain or increase their level of independence (Jesmin et al., 2012). 
Patients, not surprisingly, reported a poorer experience when services were unable to appropriately 
collaborate across health, social and third sector care (Wilson et al., 2008) or if insufficient capacity 
led to difficulties in accessing available provision (Michael, 2005). 
 
EXISTING STRUCTURE, PROCESS AND ACTIVITY 
EXISTING STRUCTURE 
The planned structure of the four RRTs was and is being affected by the system difficulties that we 
have discussed previously in this report. Only in late September 2013 was permission given to begin 
recruitment for the four teams, whilst notification of withdrawal of further allocated or unspent 
monies was made in December 2013. This led to differences in successful recruitment across the 
four teams.  
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The Lincoln team would now seem to be fully staffed. It was reported (Interview 08) that the team 
consisted of two Advanced Nurse Practitioners (Band 7), two emergency care practitioners (Band 7), 
two Nurses (Band 5), two Mental Health Nurses (Band 6) and six health-care support workers (Band 
3). The team is working well together and is confident of its focus as an admission avoidance or 
urgent response team. They operate extended hours from between 8am and 10pm. The referral 
criteria encompasses all adults aged 18 although the greatest number of patients referred are frail 
older people and their carers; ‘A lot is to do with the family having hit crisis point, they simply don’t 
know what to do’ (Interview 08). 
 
Not all numbers of staff envisaged in Boston, Louth and Grantham could be appointed before notice 
of the recruitment freeze. For example, although there was reported to be a full-time mental health 
nurse in Boston, the physical health support (a Band 7 nurse) was only available three days a week; 
necessarily limiting referrals and available support across the area. To mitigate these difficulties, the 
Lincoln team is working closely with Grantham. The Boston and Louth rapid response teams have 
joined together, ensuring greater capacity and five day a week support. However, compared with 
the Lincoln team they are operating more limited hours, 9am – 5pm. A further recent structural 
change is that they have also merged with the ‘Out of Hours’ team, enabling a more appropriate and 
‘seamless’ response. 
 
A further difficulty across the RRTs was ensuring an appropriate early role or job description for the 
generic health-care support workers. Despite on-going and in-depth conversations between the 
programme managers and providers, there was seeming confusion as to the proposed structure and 
focus of the RRTs. It was understood that those patients referred were likely to have a physical as 
well as mental health need; each necessitating assessment and support. However, the job-
descriptions of the health-care support workers only specified that they should have existing 
experience in supporting patients with a mental health need. This meant that of those 23 recruited, 
none could initially help the patient with any personal care - “they could deliver emotional support, 
but couldn’t take the patient to the toilet” [interview 09]. It was also found during this early time 
frame (December 2013) that the health-care support workers were not insured by the Care Quality 
Commission (CQC) to operate in patient’s homes.  
 
These difficulties have now been partially resolved. A period of consultation with the generic health-
care support workers to refine the job descriptions has been completed and the CQC insurance 
provided. An intensive piece of work around developing and implementing competencies in physical 
health has been undertaken and the health-care support workers have completed a range of training 
in personal care through working alongside the Independent Living Team health (nursing team) or 
support workers (re-ablement).  
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EXISTING PROCESSES: PROCESS MAPPING 
Advanced Nurses, Mental Health practitioners, Nurse Practitioners and generic health-care support 
workers from the three different RRTs were involved in the process mapping and developing the 
cause-and-effect fishbone diagrams. The final maps are provided as an attachment alongside this 
report. 
 
On receipt of a referral from either the Contact Centre or ‘Out-of-Hours team’, the RRT assessor first 
creates a paper-based patient record, referring to or using any information entered on Systmone 
(computerised patient record form). An SBAR (Situation, Background, Assessment and 
Recommendation) assessment form is then completed. Both documents are used to assess the 
appropriateness of the referral and to prioritise the likely needs of the patient. If information is 
unclear or further data required, the RRT assessor may telephone the original referrer, the patient’s 
GP (if not the referrer), carer or relative. The assessor will then contact the patient to provide 
reassurance as necessary, discuss the different treatment options (if possible) and confirm the time 
the RRT Nurse Practitioner will visit. The assessor will then update the paper and electronic 
(Systmone) patient record. If the patient is likely to need care or support from the Mental Health 
nurses, a third electronic record may need to be created on the Silverlink system.  
 
The RRT Nurse Practitioner (NP) attends and assesses the patient within two hours of receipt of the 
referral. On arrival, the nurse establishes how the patient likes to be addressed, clarifies the purpose 
of the visit and discusses with the patient their expectations of the visit. Permission is then obtained 
from the patient to continue with the assessment.  
 
A general health and social needs assessment is first undertaken. The nurse will discuss with the 
patient their recent medical problems and events leading to referral. Previous medical history will be 
taken at this time: allergies; medications; medical devices and adaptations used; any care packages 
or support already in place; and the patient’s general physical and mental well-being. Alongside this 
discussion, the nurse will observe the patient’s mental capacity, physical ability and environmental 
conditions in order to undertake a risk assessment. Appropriate physiological assessments and 
measures (e.g., respiratory and heart rate, blood pressure, blood sugar etc.) are then taken.  
 
Following these initial assessments, the NP and patient discuss the different treatment options or 
necessary alternative care and support. For example, it may be necessary, to clean (and/or close) 
and dress a wound. Similarly, if medication is required, a medication review is undertaken to check 
for drug interactions; whilst the ability of the patient to collect any prescription is assessed. If and 
when appropriate, drugs may be administered by the nurse in accordance with Patient Group 
Directions. Where additional support is required (e.g., District Nurse, Adult Social Care) the nurse will 
liaise and arrange with the relevant service (e.g., Contact Centre and then possibly with the District 
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Nurse direct). If short-term on-going care is likely to be necessary, a generic health-care assistant can 
provide a maximum of one-to-one support for a period of 72 hours.  
 
The time-frame of the NP visit ranges between 1.5 and 5.5 hours to ‘see and treat’ or ‘see, treat 
and refer’ the patient. The patient’s paper and electronic records will be updated once the patient’s 
assessment and treatment has been provided, and any onward care plan has been arranged. The NP 
may also ‘close the communication loop’ by contacting and updating the original referrer. 
EXISTING PROCESSES: ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS 
Following the process mapping exercise, the same practitioners and operational staff assessed those 
reasons – to date - underpinning the lack of clinical (GP or Ambulance) referrals to RRTs. Four 
influencing domains were explored; resource, task, human and environmental factors. The full 
diagram can be found as a further attachment alongside this report. In summary, five core barriers 
to referral were identified. 
 
1. There seemed to be a general lack of awareness cross-county of what the RRTs could 
provide. Owing to the lack of capacity of the teams, particularly in Boston and Louth and the 
consequent need to manage demand, no active wide-scale promotion of the RRTs has been 
possible. 
 
2. Appropriate care pathways are not available across all teams leading to inconsistencies in 
the care and support provided by the different teams. These variations, due to the 
differences in capacity, were perceived as likely to lead to inequalities in care. 
 
3. The care pathways provided do not necessarily meet the patients’ needs or referrers’ 
requirements. For example, the service is not available 24 hours, seven days a week, whilst 
the initial inability of the generic health-care support workers to provide on-going care in the 
patients’ home led to referrers approaching either ILT support or Adult Social Care 
brokerage. Similarly, despite the generic health-care support workers now being in place, 
care required by patients during a period of crisis may exceed the maximum 72 hours 
support that can be provided. Rapid referral to the ILT health, ILT support or adult social care 
brokerage might mitigate this latter barrier. However, it was recognised that in the four-day 
time-frame available, it would be unlikely that a patient could receive an assessment, care 
plan and implemented care package.  
 
4. Clinicians’ perception that the RRTs are simply a time-limited, low capacity ‘stop-gap’ to 
the winter pressures. Owing to their previous experience of similar projects, clinicians were 
reluctant to refer into the different teams. 
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5. Clinicians report that the necessary referral process is too time-consuming and will either 
approach other services or admit the patient to secondary/ residential care. All referrals to 
the RRT are made through the contact centre. Clinicians have reported difficulties in getting 
through to the centre, long waiting times to speak to a nurse assessor, a lack of service 
availability owing to limited capacity and perceive the number of questions necessary to 
complete a referral as excessive. The difficulties in implementing the contact centre have 
already been discussed. Owing to the changes made, the increase in capacity and the move 
to a shortened referral ‘script’; it is likely that steps have already been undertaken to 
mitigate this particular barrier. 
ACTIVITY 
Analysis was carried out on the aggregate referral data collected by the Contact Centre, whilst a 
slightly more detailed assessment was enabled through a further secondary analysis of the activity 
collated by the Lincoln RRT. 
 
Over the period of implementation of the RRTs, November 2013 to March 2014, the total number of 
referrals received across the different teams is 621. These have increased month on month by 
almost two-thirds; a 59 per cent increase between December 2013 and March 2014 (see Table 6). 
Table 6: Numbers of referrals received for all Rapid Response Teams (November 13 – March 14). 
Month Referrals: Rapid Response Teams 
(n) % 
November 27 4 
December 127 20 
January 113 18 
February 152 24 
March 202 33 
Totals  621 100 
 
The majority of referrals to the RRT are being received from GPs (see Table 7). It would seem that 
referrals from GPs are increasing incrementally, in contrast to the perception of the RRT staff 
(reported above). Referrals made in March 2013 almost tripled (270%) if compared with December 
2013. Even if it is considered that January 2014 was the first ‘real’ month of operation - given the 
challenges of implementation - referrals have almost doubled (173%). Nevertheless, the numbers 
remain small. They also demonstrate that paramedics have yet to re-engage with the contact centre 
following the challenges of implementation and/ or trust that the RRTs will have the capacity to 
deliver the necessary service. Despite a total of 74 referrals in the months of November and 
December 2013, these drop by over two thirds in January 2014 (-67%) and have, as yet, to recover.  
  
________________________________________________________________________________27 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Numbers of referrals to the RRTs by clinical area and month. 
Month EMAS, n GP, n Other, n 
November 22 14 8 
December 52 34 41 
January 17 53 43 
February 14 67 71 
March 15 76 70 
Totals 120 244 233 
 
In exploring the dispositions made by the RRTs, it would seem that by far the majority of patients are 
being managed in the community, with either the RRTs completing the care or referring onto other 
services (see table 8). Fewer than 15 per cent of patients are admitted to acute care. These figures 
could indicate a growing capacity and confidence across the RRTs. For example, the numbers of 
patients admitted to acute care in January is similar to that seen in March, yet the total admissions 
fall from 15 per cent to 9 per cent respectively.  
 
Table 8: Dispositions made by the RRTs by month. 
Month Acute Care, n Care complete, n Onward referral, n 
November 1 4 32 
December 11 35 70 
January 14 25 57 
February 12 54 70 
March 15 54 93 
Totals 53 172 322 
 
The more detailed data from the Lincoln RRT provides indications of the population being referred, 
the actions undertaken by staff and the number of days of care provided. It is not surprising that the 
mean age of the patient assessed by the Lincoln RRT, is 82, with almost the total population (89%) 
aged 70 and over (see table 9). 
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Table 9: Age range of patients referred to/ assessed by Lincoln RRT 
Age Range n %  
Aged 41 - 49 5 3 
Aged 50 - 59 3 2 
Aged 60 - 69 10 6 
Aged 70 - 79 33 20 
Aged 80 and over 116 69 
Totals 167 100 
 
Those aged 75 and over would seem to be more likely to be referred to A&E or admitted to some 
form of residential care, although this finding is not statistically significant (χ2 (3) = 6.851, p=0.077).  
However, over half are still being supported in the community (table 10), achieving the core 
objective of the RRT; providing a community-based alternative to admission (Wilson et al., 2007).  
 
Table 10: Destination of patients referred to/ assessed by Lincoln RRT 
Disposition Aged <=74 % (n) Aged >=75 % (n) 
Referral to A&E (%) 0 5 
Admission (Acute, respite, rehabilitation) (%) 18 35 
Community support (%) 64 51 
Referral to MEAU (%) 18 9 
Totals 100 (33) 100 (115) 
 
Over three-quarters of the patients (77%) have received one day’s care, with only one in ten 
requiring three or more days support. However, such figures conceal that that for many patients the 
face-to-face visit was necessary across one or more days, with two or more visits to ensure the 
patient could be appropriately supported at home; an average of 3.2 visits per patient (table 11). 
 
Table 11: Total number of face-to-face visits required. 
Total days care (1 visit) Total number of visits to 
patients 
Total number of face-to-
face visits required 
245 290 535 
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COSTS, SET-UP COSTS AND COST PER PATIENT 
The Rapid Response team is jointly managed and funded by LPFT and LCHS. There is some difficulty 
in interpreting the full costs incurred to date. It was indicated that a number of operational staff 
(Nurse Band 7, 4.1 WTE and Nurse Band 5, 7.92 WTE) were in post prior to the development of the 
RRT; i.e., their salary is not in addition to monies incurred if the RRT had not been implemented. In 
calculating the total costs, we have separated out the staff costs to exclude and include these staff. 
However, as these staff would seem to be crucial to the capacity and teams, their salaries have been 
fully included in calculating the likely per annum costs (table 13).   
 
The total cost to date (March 2014) of the RRT including set-up and operational costs is £989,218, 
excluding those staff already in post and £1,185,940 if those staff salaries are included (table 12). If 
the figures provided to the evaluation team are correct, the full per annum cost would total 
£2,493,105 (Table 7). This is a complex county-wide cross-provider service and the project 
management costs reflect this, although these are still less than 10 per cent of the total costs (8%).  
 
The cost per patient referred and attended (Table 1) over the period of development and 
implementation is £1,910. If, the Lincoln RRT data is used as an exemplar and the total number of 
visits to the patients are included (Table 6), an average of 3 face-to-face visits may be required 
across the full sample (621); a total of 1,987. Using these figures, the cost per patient referred and 
attended would reduce by over two-thirds (69%) to £597. These figures compare favourably with 
the average cost per patient reported by other rapid response teams; £954 (Curtis, 2013) 
 
Owing to the difficulties in implementation, the teams have not been working to full capacity. The 
referrals have almost doubled (173%) between January and March 2014 (see table 7). However, if 
this level of increase continued over a year, it is unlikely that the capacity of the teams would allow 
them to accept all referrals. In estimating the likely cost per patient referred, the average increase of 
referrals between January and March (44 extra referrals) is added to the total referrals received in 
March, (202). This provides an estimated monthly referral rate of 246 or, a yearly referral rate of 
2,952 patients. Again, using the average 3.2 face-to-face visits necessary (9,446), the total annual 
cost per patient referred (excluding set-up costs, table 13) may be in the region of £264. This figure 
is far lower than the average cost per patient reported by other rapid response teams (£954) and 
only £36 more expensive that the cost for a paramedic to see treat and refer, £227 (Curtis, 2013); 
the extent of the service provided by the RRT likely to involve a far longer assessment and care 
planning period.  
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Table 12: Costs to date (March 2014) of the Rapid Response Team. 
Cost item over the planning and implementation period of the RRT Cost to date 
(£) 
Budget from 
which monies 
drawn 
Total Project Management costs, LCHS & LPFT (x 8 months) 93,450 LCHS/ LPFT 
Total Staff Costs (5 months) excluding Nurse Band 7 (4.1 WTE) and 
Nurse Band 5 (7.92 WTE) 
743,282 RRT funding 
Total Staff Costs (5 months) including Nurse Band 7 (4.1 WTE) and 
Nurse Band 5 (7.92 WTE) 
940,004 RRT/ LCHS 
Non-pay staff expenditure (total annual cost/12*5) 66328 RRT 
Medical, Surgical and Clinical Equipment (total annual cost/12*5) 18,750 RRT 
IT Costs 14,000 RRT 
Workforce Training 12,300 OD Workforce 
Development 
Financial Administration 33,908 Finance 
Recruitment (Human Resources 7,200 HR 
Total spend over implementation period excluding Nurse Band 7 
(4.1 WTE) and Nurse Band 5 (7.92 WTE) 
989,218 
Total spend over implementation period including Nurse Band 7 
(4.1 WTE) and Nurse Band 5 (7.92 WTE) 
1,185,940 
 
Table 13: Total annual operating costs of the Rapid Response Team. 
Total Annual Costs (excluding Project Management and IT costs) Totals (£) 
Staff Costs (per annum) including Nurse Band 7 (4.1 WTE) and Nurse Band 5 
(7.92 WTE) 
2,256,009 
Total non-pay costs per annum 158,188 
Medical, Surgical and Clinical Equipment 45,000 
Financial Administration 33,908 
Total Annual Costs  2,493,105 
Total annual budget reported LCHS 799,341 
Total annual budget reported LPFT 1,190,788 
Total budget  1,990,129 
 
Non-cashable acute savings may be generated from the continued operation of the RRTs. Of the 
total number of referrals in March 2014, 91 per cent of patients were either managed in the 
community or referred onto other services (see table 8). The Lincoln RRT reported a somewhat 
lower number of patients managed in the community, (51%, table 10), recording those patients 
admitted to a range of bed provision (acute, community, respite and 30 day). If the yearly referral 
rate of 2,952 patients is achieved and admissions continue to be avoided in the (conservative 
estimate) of 51 per cent of cases; a total of £526,932 could be saved in acute care (assuming one 
bed-day at £350). If the figure of 91 per cent of patients is used, a total non-cashable saving of 
£940,212 could be achieved. 
________________________________________________________________________________31 
 
 
Such estimates are conservative. As we discussed, the mean age of patients referred to the Lincoln 
RRT was 82 (see table 9). Exploring the emergency admission data from ULHT (see section, 
Secondary Quantitative Analysis), three-quarters of those aged 80 and above who were admitted to 
Lincoln County Hospital (LCH), had a length of stay of two or more bed-days. A total of 5,889 
patients aged 80 and over were admitted to LCH between October 2013 and February 2014. Of 
these, 2,569 (45%) had lengths of stay of seven or more bed-days. If 51 percent of these patients 
(1,310) were continued to be managed in the community, a non-cashable saving of £3,209,966 
could be generated.  
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
It is recommended that the Rapid Response Teams are continued. Patients receive higher quality of 
care if they can be supported in their own home and the teams have demonstrated an early 
reduction in admissions. There are a number of further recommendations that LCHS, LPFT and the 
Lincolnshire CCGs may wish to discuss and explore further. 
 
1. There is a need to ensure equity of likely patient outcomes. The RRTs based at Lincoln and 
Grantham operate extended hours, five days a week, whilst the Boston and Louth team only 
operate between 9am and 5pm. If the teams are to be able to provide an urgent response 
that will appropriately avoid unnecessary admissions, they need to be available 24 hours, 
seven day week. It is understood that discussions are already being held to integrate the 
out-of-hours and RRTs. 
 
2. The RRT have demonstrated early indications that they can effectively manage patients in 
the community, avoiding unnecessary admissions. It is recommended that this ‘urgent-
response’ focus is continued, rather than migrating the teams’ activities towards 
supported discharge.  
 
3. Work still needs to be undertaken to ensure that all staff, particularly the generic health-
care support workers, can be fully integrated within the teams. As we discussed above, a 
robust and coherent team structure and process (e.g., number of team meetings, active 
promotion of team cohesiveness and open communication) would seem to result in 
improved patient outcomes (Smith et al., 2013). There are a number of well-known tools 
that could support this activity, e.g., a Quality Improvement Initiative (Ryvicker et al., 2011). 
Nancarrow et al., (2005), also reported success through a developed Interdisciplinary 
Management Tool. Working through a facilitated “Organisation Development” approach, the 
authors demonstrated a measureable improvement in team-working.  
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4. The process mapping exercise highlighted a number of inefficiencies; in particular the 
seeming unnecessary duplication of patient records, paper and electronic format and 
across different electronic systems (e.g., Systmone and Silverlink). From conversations with 
the programme managers, it would seem that all patient records should be managed 
electronically on Systmone; any duplication likely to lead to increased risk to patients and 
governance difficulties. However, it would seem that the RRT nurses create and use paper 
records owing to the lack of, or intermittent access to the network in the community and the 
perception feeling that ‘laptops’ present a barrier to discussion when working alongside the 
patient. 
 
5. The focus and availability of the RRTs now need to be publicised more widely across 
providers (e.g., GPs, paramedics, care homes) and commissioners responsible for urgent 
care. The initial problems with implementation necessarily limited the extent to which the 
service could be more widely publicised.  
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AMBULATORY EMERGENCY CARE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Three Ambulatory Emergency Care (AEC) units were set up across ULHT; at Lincoln County Hospital 
(LCH), Pilgrim Hospital (PHB) and Grantham and District Hospital (GDH). Each unit has a slightly 
different model of care delivery, although all have developed a range of ambulatory care pathways 
e.g., Pulmonary Embolism, Cellulitis, Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (NHS Institute for 
Innovation and Improvement, 2007; Purdy et al., 2009). The AEC unit in Lincoln consists of eight 
Advanced Nurse Practitioners (ANPs) and is led by an A&E consultant. The unit is physically located 
behind the A&E department in what was previously an observation ward. In PHB, the AEC unit is 
based next to the Clinical Decision Unit (CDU), is led by a medical consultant and the team includes 
registrars, junior doctors, and nurse practitioners (NPs). Owing to a capital investment programme 
to reconfigure and integrate urgent care, the AEC in GDH is presently integrated within the Medical 
Emergency Assessment Unit (MEAU), where two beds are reserved for ambulatory care patients. A 
dedicated AEC unit will be in place in Autumn 2014. The MEAU is staffed by two medical consultants, 
an ANP, nurse practitioners and health-care support workers. The times of operation similarly vary. 
The LCH AEC unit is staffed seven days a week from 8am to midnight, whilst the team at PHB are 
operational five days a week, working extended hours, (8am – 10pm). The AEC unit at GDH operate 
slightly shorter weekly hours, operational between 8am and 6pm. The LCH and PHB AEC units see 
between 10 – 15 patients a day, whilst between two or three are referred to the AEC unit at GDH. All 
teams were operational from November 2013. 
 
EVIDENCE FROM THE LITERATURE 
 
The arguments underpinning the necessity to develop and implement an AEC response are well-
understood; ‘The pressure is on secondary care, it is the point of least resistance and the last man 
standing’ (Interview 03). Multiple morbidities of long-term conditions are estimated to exceed 20 
per cent of the population and levels are higher in deprived populations (Barnett et al., 2012). Multi-
morbidity is now considered the norm for people over 65 (Smith & O’Dowd, 2007). Many long-term 
conditions also fall within the definition of ‘ambulatory care sensitive conditions’ (ACSCs); those 
conditions for which primary, community or timely acute management, should prevent hospital 
admission (Freund et al., 2013; McCallum et al., 2010; Purdy et al., 2008). ACSCs account for one-in-
six of all emergency admissions in England, cost the NHS £1.42 billion annually (Tian et al., 2012) and 
are projected to rise by 42 per cent over the next 14 years (Dr Foster Intelligence, 2008).  
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Appropriate management of ACSCs has been highlighted as one of the top ten priorities for 
commissioners (Naylor et al., 2013) and one of the CCGs key performance indicators is the 
measurement of unplanned (emergency) hospital admissions of chronic ACSCs. The ambulatory care 
centre or unit is also perceived as a central resource within the newly proposed ‘Acute Care Hub’ 
(Future Hospital Commission, 2013); this ‘hub’ integrating a range of resources that will focus on the 
initial assessment and stabilisation of acutely ill medical patients. In particular, ‘[C]are will be 
organised so that ambulatory (‘day case’) emergency care is the default position for emergency 
patients, unless their clinical needs require admission’ (Future Hospital Commission, 2013: 28). 
 
DEFINITIONS AND MODELS 
In contrast to many services operating across the health and social care environment, there is an 
accepted definition of the focus and delivery of care within AECs. The RCP Acute Medicine Task 
Force defines ambulatory emergency care as high quality clinical care that is provided in the 
interface between community and secondary care; rather than in traditional outpatient or hospital 
beds. The clinical care delivered may include diagnosis, observation, treatment or rehabilitation and 
should be available in secondary care as part of an overall flexible emergency response. When 
placed in acute medicine; ‘it is care of a condition that is perceived either by the patient or by the 
referring practitioner as urgent, and that requires prompt clinical assessment, undertaken by a 
competent clinical decision maker’. The healthcare setting may vary, but optimal clinical care will 
require prompt access to diagnostic support (RCP, 2007: 11). 
 
There is a recognition that the model of any AEC unit will vary; ‘one size will not fit all’ (RCP, 2007: 8). 
A recent national survey of 131 acute hospitals explored the current level of AEC provision. It was 
found that dedicated coordinated AEC services were available in just under a quarter of hospitals 
(McCallum et al., 2010); with the majority of AEC type provision being more ‘ad-hoc’. One or two 
members of staff would carry out a number of ‘AEC type’ tasks (e.g., diagnostics and setting up a 
care plan) within a range of different clinical provision; respiratory services, A&E or medical 
emergency assessment units.  
 
There is no clarity as to the optimal number and skill-set of AEC staff. From a brief exploration across 
existing grey literature, (those reports or data not published in peer-reviewed journals), it would 
seem that staffing varies. For example, one AEC in South London is managed and run by two ANPs, 
whilst in contrast; an AEC centre in the north of England is led by a Medical Consultant and staffed 
by a mixture of ANPs, nurse practitioners and generic health-care support workers. There is no 
evidence, as yet, as to whether such different staffing models result in improved system or patient 
outcomes, e.g., reduction in emergency admissions, readmissions or improvement in health-related 
quality of life.  
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A similar lack of evidence exists when the effectiveness of access times are explored. The majority of 
AEC units are available during standard working hours on weekdays (McCullum, 2010). Where 
extended or seven-day provision was in place, it was found that a more limited range of services are 
on offer at the weekend (McCullum, 2010). Commentators argue that such a structure may result in 
unnecessary weekend admissions (Ala et al., 2012; Duffin, 2013; Freund, 2013). No evidence is 
presented or is available that can support or refute this argument.  
 
SECONDARY CARE OUTCOMES 
The core focus of the AEC is to assess, diagnose and discharge the patient within the same day. The 
relatively recent emergence of AEC units as a clinical resource, means there is little robust research 
that causally associates the presence (or absence) of an AEC with an increase in zero bed-days or 
reduction in length of stay of one or two days. Much of the literature is either couched in terms of 
the potential resource impact of ACSCs (Purdy et al., 2009) and the likely potential, rather than 
actual, outcomes (e.g., see Tian et al., 2012, Future Hospital Commission, 2013). For example, a 
publication produced by the NHS Institute for Innovation and Improvement (2009) stated that by 
reducing the lengths of stay of one and two bed-nights, savings of at least £683.8 million could be 
made. There is no discussion as to whether existing AECs are achieving these savings.  
 
Internal evaluations, (reporting in the grey literature), have found tentative indications that AECs are 
delivering effective outcomes (e.g., see Duffin, 2013; NHS Institute for Improvement and Innovation, 
2009). For example: fewer beds have been required to delivery emergency care; ‘AECs have 
converted between 20 – 30 per cent of emergency admissions into same-day events’ and patient 
outcomes have improved (Duffin, 2013: 9). However, these evaluations are of poor quality and 
validity; using raw, rather than standardised or trend data.  
 
This lack of findings does not lead to a conclusion that AECs are ineffective. The evidence is simply 
not available to provide a transparent link between their high quality activity and outcomes.  
 
PATIENT OUTCOMES 
The lack of literature available to assess the impact of AECs is similarly found when the patient 
experience or outcomes are considered. In general, it is well-known that patients want to avoid 
hospital admissions if possible (Davies et al., 2007) and report high-satisfaction with those services 
that are able to support this aim (Hattrick & Bentham, 2012). A further benefit of the AECs approach, 
‘see, treat and discharge’ in the same-day time-frame, is that the risk of hospital acquired admissions 
is significantly reduced (RCP, 2007). However, there is no literature that explores the impact of the 
AEC unit on the wider range of patient outcomes, e.g., improved self-management, reduced use of 
clinical resources and/ or improvement in health-related quality of life.   
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EXISTING PROCESS AND ACTIVITY 
EXISTING PROCESS 
The care process of each AEC unit was reviewed to gain a better understanding of the structures and 
processes of care as they currently operate. Non-participant observation was carried out at LCH AEC 
unit to develop the process map; the patient journey being observed from admission to discharge. 
Interviews with senior management and clinical staff in the other two sites fed into the development 
of these process maps; whilst in GDH previously developed process maps were also shared with the 
evaluation team. The final maps are provided as a further attachment alongside this report. 
 
Direct referrals to the AECs are most often received from GPs, although patients are also referred by 
other community-based clinicians (e.g., paramedics, nurse practitioners), primary care services 
(Walk-in-Centres) and secondary care departments or wards (e.g., A&E, MEAU, CDU). Clinicians will 
contact the AEC units prior to referral to discuss its appropriateness, determine a general care plan 
and identify if capacity is available to accept their patient. If the AEC is deemed inappropriate or 
there is no capacity, ACU clinicians will suggest alternative options, signposting the referrer to other 
care pathways. ‘It’s a relatively new service, so there’s a lot of people who aren’t used to the concept 
of AECs, so some of the referrals are a little wide of the mark. We gently redirect to other care points 
– that’s a regular occurrence’ (Interview 12) 
 
On arrival at the AEC, the patient record will be created on the computerised Patient Administration 
System (PAS), although this may have been previously completed during the telephone discussion 
with the referring clinician. The patient will be invited to an examination room where they will wait 
to be assessed. The initial assessment is usually conducted either by an ANP, nurse practitioner or in 
some instances by a junior doctor. Medical history is taken before the physical examination. At this 
point, relevant samples are drawn or tests arranged. Some samples and tests, for example bloods 
an electrocardiogram (ECG), will be undertaken by the attending clinician, whereas others (e.g., CT-
scan, X-rays, or Echocardiogram) may need to be arranged with other departments.  
 
It was found that where the patient was labelled ‘ambulatory care’, the necessary tests were often 
expedited; where possible, those patients tests being accelerated. Once the patient has been fully 
assessed and test results received, a diagnosis and treatment care plan will be decided. This is a 
collaborative process between nurse practitioners and/or junior doctors with a senior reviewer (e.g., 
A&E consultant, medical consultant or other specialist senior clinician). A consultation will then take 
place with the patient to discuss their diagnosis, treatment options and any plans for on-going care. 
Where possible, the patient will then be prepared for discharge. The nurse will prepare appropriate 
documentation (advice sheets, prescriptions, discharge letter); arranging necessary future 
appointments, referrals and/or community care support. For example, the nurse may telephone 
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the Contact Centre to arrange for a district nurse to visit at some point during the next couple of 
days. On some occasions, discharge may not be appropriate and the ANP or nurses will arrange for 
the necessary admission and onward patient care.  
 
There are a number of barriers to efficient patient flow. The main barrier highlighted as limiting 
same day discharge was, not surprisingly, the availability of timely tests (e.g., an Echocardiogram or 
Endoscopy unavailable after 6pm). A further barrier that has also seemingly emerged is the 
necessary culture change that has been demanded following the implementation of each AEC unit. 
There would seem to be reluctance by some clinical teams to attend to the patient within the AEC; 
‘they haven’t as yet made the culture shift that coming to see them down here will mean they don’t 
have to be admitted yet’ (Interview 12). On such occasions, arrangements are made to transfer the 
patient to the ward or department for the tests to be conducted. Once tests are completed, the 
patient will be returned to the AEC.  
 
Further delays were identified owing to a lack of facilitates and equipment. As yet, the AECs have a 
limited number of examination rooms. Patient flow can be compromised if a patient is waiting for 
tests and is too unwell to sit in the waiting area. It could be argued that if the patient is non-
ambulatory, they should be referred onto another department or ward in the hospital. Nevertheless, 
there is a need to be flexible as to the range of conditions accepted to AECs with the ability to 
‘create a bespoke guideline for the individual patient if that is something that is right for them’ 
(Interview 12). Lack of equipment has also been highlighted as restricting patient flow. For example, 
one AEC has access to only one ECG monitor, causing delays during busy periods.  
 
The final barrier to ensuring same-day discharge is that of staff capacity and the necessary skill-mix 
required to deliver this complex resource. For example, in PHB AEC, the NPs are undertaking or have 
undertaken the necessary e.g., history taking, assessment, non-medical prescribing modules, to 
move to ANP status. They are often unable to carry out this role, (taking the necessary medical 
history or developing the care plan), owing to the need for them to provide ‘hands-on’ treatment to 
the patients. Similarly, all nurses (either ANPs or NPs) would seem to spend a great deal of time 
either in ‘in-take’ duties (entering and re-entering data on the PAS) or arranging the necessary 
clinical tests. 
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ACTIVITY 
 
Each of the AEC units is recording their own activity, although there have been difficulties in 
combining these data centrally; none of the activity is being recorded as AEC unit data. Of the data 
available to the evaluation team, the AEC at LCH have seen a total of 1,600 patients (November 2013 
– March 2014), an average of 10 patients a day. A total of 1,206 patients have been seen at PHB 
(October 2013 – January 2014), an average of 15 patients a day. The difference in these totals is due 
to the time-frame of operation; PHB is open five days a week, whilst LCH admits patient seven days a 
week. We have already discussed that GDH operated a slightly different model, seeing on average 
between two and three patients a day.  
 
EXEMPLAR DATA, LINCOLN COUNTY HOSPITAL AEC UNIT: THE PATIENT PATHWAY 
To explore further the likely age ranges, diagnoses and pathway of patients attending the ULHT AEC 
units, we have drawn on the first 600 patient records collated by LCH AEC unit. The analyses of these 
data and suggested findings are presented as exemplars only. The AEC unit was in the early stages of 
implementation (November – February 2013) and work has been undertaken since to streamline 
processes and pathways. 
 
Over a third of patients are either under 45 or over 65, (37% and 36% respectively), with a mean age 
of 53 years (see table 14). 
 
Table 14: Age ranges of patients attending Lincoln AEC between November 2013 and February 2014. 
Age range n % 
Aged 0 - 45 223 37 
Aged 46 - 54 96 16 
Aged 55 - 64 67 11 
Aged 65 - 74 85 14 
Aged 75 and over 129 22 
Totals 600 100 
 
In exploring the day of admission, the pattern across the week is relatively stable. Slightly greater 
numbers of patients are admitted on a Monday, with just under a fifth (22%) being admitted at the 
weekend (table 15). 
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Table 15: Day patients admitted to Lincoln AEC between November 2013 and February 2014 
Day of admission Total, % (n) 
Monday 19 (115) 
Tuesday 14 (82) 
Wednesday 14 (84) 
Thursday 16 (94) 
Friday 15 (90) 
Saturday 12 (72) 
Sunday 10 (63) 
Totals 100 (600) 
 
Almost two-thirds of the patients were referred to the AEC from A&E with a further third being 
referred by the GP (table 16). As we will discuss below, the extent of referrals from A&E during this 
time may be due to patients being referred to the AEC to mitigate the four hour A&E breach. 
However, the physical placement of the Lincoln AEC unit, behind the A&E department, is more likely 
to be the key factor in explaining these findings. 
 
Table 16: Place of referral of patients attending Lincoln AEC between November 2013 and February 2014 
Place of referral n % 
Patient referred by A&E 346 64 
Patient referred by GP 169 31 
Patient referred by OOH service 20 4 
Patient referred by Walk-in Centre 7 1 
Totals 542 100 
 
Where the patient was referred from did not seem to be age-related; i.e., older people are no less 
(or more) likely to be referred by their GP than their younger counterparts. Few patients are 
admitted outside the hours of the AEC unit’s operation (8am to Midnight), with the busiest 
admission period between midday and 8pm (table 17).  
 
Table 17: Time of arrival of attending Lincoln AEC between November 2013 and February 2014. 
Time of arrival % (n) 
Midnight to 7.59am 2 (11) 
8am to 11.59am 28 (166) 
Midday to 7.59pm 67 (402) 
8pm to 11.59pm 3 (21) 
Totals 100 (600) 
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Older people are more likely to be admitted to the Lincoln AEC unit later in the day (table 18). This 
may have an impact on necessary capacity during these times. Older people are likely to present 
with complex comorbidities (Vogeli, 2007) that in turn may demand a greater number of tests. Any 
difficulties in obtaining these could result in an admission to a ward. Alternatively, any complex 
presentation may also necessitate admission and from our analysis a greater number of older people 
are being admitted to an LCH ward when compared with younger patients (table 19). 
 
Table 18: Arrival time of patients aged 0 – 64 and 65 and over attending Lincoln AEC between November 2013 and February 2014. 
Age range Arrival between 
8am and 
11.59am, % (n) 
Arrival between 
Midday and 7.59pm, 
% (n) 
Totals, % (n) 
Aged 0 - 64 33 (119) 67 (246) 100 (365) 
Aged 65 and over 23 (47) 77 (156) 100 (203) 
Totals 56 (166) 100 (402) 100 (568) 
Fisher’s Exact = 0.021 
 
Table 19: Age range of those patients admitted to a ULHT ward from Lincoln AEC between November 2013 and February 2014. 
Age range Admitted to a 
ULHT ward, %, (n) 
Not Admitted to a 
ULHT ward, % (n) 
Totals, % (n) 
Aged 0 - 64 13 (51) 87 (335) 100 (386) 
Aged 65 and over 23 (50) 77 (164) 100 (214) 
Fisher’s Exact = 0.002 
 
To explore further if age was the core characteristic that determined admission, a logistic regression 
was carried out that included the following variables: month, age, patient symptoms and whether 
diagnostic tests, the assertive in-reach team or transport were being awaited by the patient. This 
was a statistically significant model (χ 2 (33) = 79.550, p=<0.001) that explained 21 per cent of the 
variance in hospital admissions. Of the 33 predicator variables included, only three were significant. 
Older people (aged 65 and over) were 2.5 times as likely to be admitted to a ward, whilst if the 
presentation symptom was acute urine retention, individuals were three times as likely to be 
admitted. The only other significant variable was that of chest-pain, but this was associated with a 
reduction in the likelihood of being admitted.  
 
In Lincoln AEC unit, the ANPs have been encouraged to be ‘generally eclectic’ (Interview 12) when 
selecting the senior reviewer. The majority of consultations were carried out with the medical team 
(table 20), which were three times more likely to be carried out face-to-face (logistic regression, χ2(9) 
=46.663, p=<0.001). 
________________________________________________________________________________41 
 
 
Table 20: Consultations carried out with clinical specialists for patients admitted to Lincoln AEC unit between November 2013 and 
February 2014. 
Consultation with clinical specialty % (n) 
Medical team 44 (114) 
Cardiac team 21 (54) 
Surgical team 5 (12) 
Urological team 7 (19) 
Orthopaedic team 8 (20) 
Assertive in-reach team 7 (17) 
Pain team 2 (4) 
Hospital Intensive Psychiatric Team (HIPS) 5 (14) 
Oncology team 1 (4) 
Totals 100 (258) 
 
From our analysis it would seem that a third of patients (34%, 203) were admitted to the Lincoln AEC 
unit to avoid the four hour A&E breach. Patients were more likely to be admitted to the AEC if they 
were older (table 21) and had attended in the months of November and December (table 22, figure 
2). A logistic regression was carried out that included the variables of age, month and patient 
symptoms. The model was statistically significant, (χ 2 (34) = 102.950, p=<0.001). Of the 34 predictor 
variables included, only four were statistically significant: month, age, if the patient reported chest 
pain or if s/he had suffered a fall. Older patients are 1.5 times as likely to be bought into the AEC unit 
to avoid an A&E breach; those individuals who had suffered a fall were three times as likely to be 
admitted to the AEC unit, whilst those with a diagnosis of chest pain are 1.5 times as likely.  
 
That a third of patients are likely to be admitted to the Lincoln AEC unit to avoid a four hour breach 
may have an impact on the unit’s admission criteria or capacity. However, it may have been found 
that on confirmation of diagnosis, it would have been appropriate to treat the patient in the AEC 
unit. For example, ACSC pathways exist for ‘Low Risk Chest Pain’, whilst a fall could have been the 
result of a number of ACSCs, e.g., diabetes complications, iron-deficiency anaemia, hypertension 
(Purdy et al., 2009). Alternatively, this may simply be an artefact of the early implementation of the 
AEC. That is, whilst appropriate GP and A&E referrals were being built up, further capacity was 
available to support the A&E department. 
Table 21: Age range of patients admitted to the Lincoln AEC unit to mitigate the four hour A&E breach. 
Age range Did admission to Lincoln AEC mitigate the 
four hour A&E breach? 
No % (n) Yes % (n) Totals % (n) 
Aged 0 - 64 69 (268) 31 (118) 100 (386) 
Aged 65 and over 60 (129) 40 (85) 100 (214) 
Fishers Exact Test = 0.025 
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Table 22: Months that patients’ were admitted to mitigate the four hour A&E breach. 
Month Did admission to ACU mitigate the 4 hour 
breach? 
No % (n) Yes % (n) Totals % (n) 
November 2013 57 (111) 43 (85) 100 (196) 
December 2013 67 (164) 33 (82) 100 (246 
January 2014 78 (71) 22 (20) 100 (91) 
February 2014 78 (51) 24 (16) 100 (67) 
χ 
2
(3) = 16.664, p=<0.01 
Figure 2: Months that patients’ were admitted to mitigate the four hour A&E breach. (%). 
 
 
A number of positive outcomes stemmed from the operation of the LCH AEC unit. GP admissions 
were prevented in almost a fifth of cases (18%, 106/600) and almost the total sample (93%) required 
no follow up. Over three-quarters of patients were discharged home, with less than a fifth being 
necessarily admitted to a ward in LCH (table 23). 
Table 23: Discharge location for patients admitted to Lincoln AEC unit between November 2013 and February 2014. 
Discharge location n % 
Discharged Home 464 79 
Discharged Care Home 7 1 
Discharged to Lincoln County Hospital 101 17 
Other end point 19 3 
Totals 591 100 
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COSTS, SET-UP COSTS, COST PER PATIENT AND NON-CASHABLE SAVINGS 
 
The total reported cost of all three ULHT AEC units across eight months (August 2013 – March 2014) 
is £432,000 (table 24). The set up costs consist of less than 10 per cent of the budget (7%). The total 
cost of running all AECs for one calendar year in the structure and processes explored above, and 
excluding all set-up costs is £600, 594. Estimating the total number of patients seen per annum (see 
table 25); the total cost per patient is £197. Such a figure does not take into account the necessary 
tests or further admissions to any secondary care department or ward. The full cost of providing an 
AEC service to patients cannot be estimated (e.g., number and extent of diagnostic tests, admissions, 
outpatient’s appointments) as no individual level pathway data was collected.  
Table 24: Total report costs of ULHT AEC units (August 2013 to March 2014). 
August 13 to March 14 Total cost (£) 
Set up costs Project management 14,097 
IT costs 1,390 
Workforce training 1,500 
Equipment, chairs, trolley's 14,618 
On-going 
costs 
Staffing 395,459 
Medical consumables 4,937 
Total budget 432,000 
Total yearly costs (excluding set-up costs) 600,594 
 
Non-cashable savings can be generated from the continued operation of the AEC units. If GP 
admissions continue to be prevented in 18 per cent of the cases, (1,450), savings of over half a 
million pounds (£507,500) per annum could be available; assuming that each prevented admission 
would have used one bed-day (costed at £350 per day). In interviews with senior strategic staff and 
clinicians, the estimated proportion of avoided admissions has been given as 70 per cent. Such a 
figure is similar to the numbers of patients that were discharged to home (79%) after attending LCH 
(see table 23). Again, assuming a saving of 6,365 bed days (79% of 8,058) at £350 per bed-day cost, a 
£2,227,750 non-cashable saving may be possible. 
 
Table 25: Estimated yearly patient demand at each AEC site. 
AEC site Actual number of 
patients 
Months of 
operation 
Estimated yearly 
'footfall' 
Lincoln County Hospital 1,600 5 3,840 
Pilgrim Hospital 1,206 4 3,618 
Grantham District Hospital 250 5 600 
Totals 3,056  8,058 
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Care does need to be taken in using these figures as the basis of any further implementation 
programme or business case. For example, although 79 per cent of patients attending LCH AEC unit 
were discharged home, the figure of 65 per cent was given for those patients admitted to PHB AEC 
unit. Similarly, work would need to be carried out on individual level data to assess the patient 
pathway. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
It is recommended that the AEC units are continued across ULHT. Such units are a core part of future 
urgent care policy and practice. In particular, each unit has demonstrated early ability to diagnose, 
treat and discharge in the same-day time frame; reducing bed-days and longer-term lengths of stay. 
 
There are a number of further recommendations that ULHT may wish to explore and discuss.  
 
1. Commissioners need to be clear about which admissions they consider to be avoidable, what 
proportion of these admissions are avoidable, and how these admissions should be coded 
and measured. (Purdy, 2010). 
 
2. Further work may wish to be undertaken on ensuring referral from the A&E departments to 
each AEC can be expedited as quickly as possible. PHB is using the ‘Amb score’ (Ala et al., 
2012) in their A&E department to assess those patients that can be immediately referred 
onto the AEC. This simple scoring system that predicts the likelihood of same-day discharge, 
may wish to be used across the other AECs. 
 
3. Over two-thirds of patients attending the LCH AEC unit are admitted between Midday and 
8pm (table 17). To ensure this demand is appropriately met, all AECs could consider 
operating between 8am and 12pm to ensure same-day discharge can to be achieved. 
Similarly, further staff capacity may be necessary during this time-period to ensure the 
more complex needs of older people (see tables 18 and 19) can be appropriately addressed, 
mitigating onward department or ward admission.  
 
4. Over a fifth of admissions (22%) to LCH AEC unit were carried out at the weekend with over 
three-quarters of the patients discharged home. All AECs may wish to consider operating 
seven days a week to ensure that onward admission to secondary care can continue to be 
reduced.  
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5. There is a need to increase nurse and ANP staff capacity, particularly at PHB, to ensure 
continuing timely diagnoses and care planning can be carried out. 
 
6. Further work needs to be undertaken on informing other key staff and departments as to 
the focus and role of the AEC units. Such support may benefit the AEC units in two ways; 
timely tests or equipment could be made available and key staff could carry out diagnoses 
and care plan support on the AEC unit, rather than in their own departments. 
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SECONDARY QUANTATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The overarching aim of the Admissions Avoidance Programme was to reduce emergency admissions 
by 5,000 finished consultant episodes (pro rata) over the period of October 2013 to February 2014. A 
secondary quantitative analysis was undertaken to evaluate if the early implementation of the 
projects had indeed achieved this aim or were affecting other measures; number of bed-days, 
lengths of stay or readmissions.  
 
Data was received from the Greater East Midlands Commissioning Support Unit (GEMCSU) that 
detailed all emergency admissions from April 2012 to March 2014. Our initial analyses of these data 
using statistical process control (SPC) and run charts, focused on ULHT provision (LCH, PHB and 
GDH). A further analysis using descriptive statistics and logistical regression was then carried out to 
explore further any observed changes found in the SPC charts. To ensure any impact of the projects 
could be evaluated, two time periods were compared; October 2012 to February 2013 and October 
2013 to February 2014. 
 
STATISTICAL PROCESS CONTROL ANALYSIS 
Over the two year period, no special cause variation was found in the monthly emergency 
admissions for ULHT. The mean monthly number of admissions was 4,840 (Figure 3) 
Figure 3: Number of emergency admissions at ULHT, April 2012 to February 2014. 
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A special cause variation was seen in the number of readmissions. In February 2014, the mean 
monthly number of readmissions (621) fell below the lower control limit of 446 (Figure 4). 
Figure 4: Total readmissions to ULHT, April 2012 to February 2014. 
 
The number of bed-days being used across ULHT demonstrated two instances of special cause 
variation. October 2013 marked the end of a five month sequence during which the number of bed 
days was more than one sigma away from the mean of 30,145 (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5: Number of bed days (including admissions for a single day) to ULHT, April 2012 to February 2014 
 
When exploring the number of bed-days further and excluding emergency admissions for a single 
day (Tian et al., 2011), a downward shift in the number of bed days for ULHT was found; from the 
mean of 30,066 to 27,632 in June 2013 (Figure 6). 
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Figure 6: Number of bed days (excluding admissions for a single day) for ULHT 
 
 
SECONDARY ANALYSIS: LINCOLN COUNTY HOSPITAL. 
From the above analysis, it would seem that some change in bed-days and readmissions was seen. 
We therefore carried out further analysis to understand the extent of change.  
 
1. The descriptive statistics for the two winter periods are presented in tables 26 and 27 
(below). The mean number of bed-days in the first winter period (October 12 – February 13) 
is 6.55, slightly higher than the national average of 5.47 (NAO, 2013). Those aged 70 and 
over make up over a third of admissions (40%). Of the overall admissions, 10 per cent were 
‘flagged’ as ambulatory care sensitive conditions (ACSCs); those conditions for which 
hospital admission could have been prevented in primary care (Purdy et al., 2009; Purdy et 
al., 2008; McCallum, 2010). It can also be seen that 11 per cent of patients were readmitted 
within 30 days. 
 
2. In comparing these data with the second winter period, the findings from the SPC charts 
would seem to be confirmed; although we present further analyses (see tables 28 to 33) to 
assess if a statistically significant change was found. Emergency bed-days fell in the second 
winter period (October 2013 – February 2014) from 6.55 to 6.28. Similarly, the proportion of 
ASCS ‘flagged’ emergency admissions fell 0.6 per cent (9.57% to 8.97%). The proportion of 
readmissions reduced by 1.3 per cent (11% to 9.65%). 
 
  
C
20,000
22,000
24,000
26,000
28,000
30,000
32,000
34,000
36,000
01
/0
4/
20
12
01
/0
5/
20
12
01
/0
6/
20
12
01
/0
7/
20
12
01
/0
8/
20
12
01
/0
9/
20
12
01
/1
0/
20
12
01
/1
1/
20
12
01
/1
2/
20
12
01
/0
1/
20
13
01
/0
2/
20
13
01
/0
3/
20
13
01
/0
4/
20
13
01
/0
5/
20
13
01
/0
6/
20
13
01
/0
7/
20
13
01
/0
8/
20
13
01
/0
9/
20
13
01
/1
0/
20
13
01
/1
1/
20
13
01
/1
2/
20
13
01
/0
1/
20
14
01
/0
2/
20
14
Special Cause Flag 
In
d
iv
id
u
a
l 
V
a
lu
e
 
Period 
________________________________________________________________________________49 
 
 
 
Table 26: Summary statistics for October12-Februrary 13 (winter period 1) for ULHT (n=23,277). 
Variable Number of observations Mean/Percentage 
Number of bed nights  5.55 
Number of bed days  6.55 
Sex 
Male 11,112 47.74% 
Female 12,165 52.26% 
Age 
TOTAL  54.41 
0-20 years old 4,028 17.30% 
21-40 years old 3,238 13.91% 
41-60 years old 4,071 17.49% 
61-69 years old 2,642 11.35% 
70-79 years old 3,599 15.46% 
80-89 years old 4,220 18.13% 
90-112 years old 1,479 6.35% 
Method of admission 
Via A&E 15,636 67.17% 
Via GP 5,779 24.83% 
Via Bed Bureau 12 0.05% 
Via consultant 
outpatient clinic 
575 2.47% 
Other means 1,275 5.48% 
Method of discharge 
Discharged on 
clinical advice 
21,890 94.04% 
Self discharged 370 1.59% 
Discharged by a 
mental health 
review tribunal 
0 0.00% 
Died 1,016 4.36% 
Patient still in 
hospital (not 
applicable) 
1 0.00% 
Patients with Ambulatory 
Care Sensitive Conditions 
No 21,050 90.43% 
Yes 2,227 9.57% 
Patients readmitted 
No 20,717 89.00% 
Yes 2,560 11.00% 
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Table 27: Summary statistics for Oct13-Feb14 (winter period 2) for ULHT (n=22,599). 
Variable Number of observations Mean/Percentage 
Number of bed nights  5.28 
Number of bed days  6.28 
Sex 
Male 10,683 47.35% 
Female 11,878 52.65% 
Age 
TOTAL  55.16 
0-20 years old 3,751 16.60% 
21-40 years old 3,001 13.28% 
41-60 years old 3,972 17.58% 
61-69 years old 2,668 11.81% 
70-79 years old 3,618 16.01% 
80-89 years old 4,178 18.49% 
90-112 years old 1,411 6.24% 
Method of admission 
Via A&E 15,371 68.02% 
Via GP 5,405 23.92% 
Via Bed Bureau 7 0.03% 
Via consultant 
outpatient clinic 
554 2.45% 
Other means 1,262 5.58% 
Method of discharge 
Discharged on 
clinical advice 
21,307 94.28% 
Self discharged 349 1.54% 
Discharged by a 
mental health 
review tribunal 
1 0.00% 
Died 942 4.17% 
Patient still in 
hospital (not 
applicable) 
0 0.00% 
Patients with Ambulatory 
Care Sensitive Conditions 
No 20,571 91.03% 
Yes 2,028 8.97% 
Patients readmitted 
No 20,418 90.35% 
Yes 2,181 9.65% 
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3. In exploring table 28 (below), the first thing to note is the statistically significant change in 
zero bed-nights. These increased from 5,050 to 5,487, an 8.65 per cent increase, 
representing 21.7 and 24.28 per cent (respectively) of overall bed-nights. Bed-nights, not 
surprisingly, increase as the patient ages. For example, in October 2012 to February 2013, 
less than 2 per cent of patients aged 0 – 20 were admitted for seven or more bed-nights, 
whilst a third of patients (33%) aged 80 – 89 had an emergency admission equal to or 
greater than seven days. Nevertheless, in comparing the two winter periods, the proportion 
of zero bed-nights are also increasing for the ‘older-old’, those aged 80 and above. Zero bed-
nights increase from 11.78 percent of total admissions in the first winter period (Oct 2012 – 
Feb 2013) to 13.12 per cent in the second (Oct 2013 – Feb 2014). 
 
4. There has been a small decrease in the overall proportion of zero bed-night emergency 
admissions for those patients ‘flagged’ as having an ACSC (table 29). When the winter 
periods are compared, zero bed-nights as a proportion of the overall ASCS admissions 
reduces from 5.96 to 5.72 per cent respectively. In contrast, it was found that there was a 
proportional increase in two other categories; one bed-night stays increased from 8.48 per 
cent to 9.47 per cent, whilst patients staying two to six bed-nights demonstrated a small 
increase from 10.34 to 10.63 percent. Longer bed-nights, greater or equal to seven, do seem 
to be proportionally decreasing, reducing by 3 per cent (12.67% to 9.69%). 
 
5.  For those patients who need to be readmitted within 30 days, it would seem that 
proportionally fewer patients are staying either seven or more bed-nights (table 30). The 
overall percentage falls from 14.32 to 9.9 per cent. However, over a third of patients (in both 
winter periods) are re-admitted for between two to six bed-nights; with the proportion 
increasing in the second winter period. 
 
6. To explore if patient bed-nights had reduced when comparing the two winter periods a 
logistic regression was carried out that included the following variables: the two winter 
periods, age range and ASCS flag (table 31). This was a statistically significant model 
(p=<0.001), although only six per cent of the variance in bed-nights was explained. Of the 
variables included, all were significant, with bed-nights reducing in the second winter period. 
Older people are more likely to use a greater number of bed-days. For example, those aged 
80 – 90 are five and half times more likely to use between 1 and 100 bed-nights. Patients 
with an ASCS flag are one and a half times more likely to use a greater number of bed-nights.  
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Table 28: Bed nights by age for ULHT. 
Age 
Oct12-Feb13 Oct13-Feb14 
0 nights 1 night 2-6 nights 7-100 nights Total 0 nights 1 night 2-6 nights 7-100 nights Total 
0-20 years old 
1,752 1,266 909 101 4,028 1,678 1,157 792 124 3,751 
43.50% 31.43% 22.57% 2.51% 100.00% 44.73% 30.85% 21.11% 3.31% 100.00% 
34.69% 24.96% 12.44% 1.73% 17.30% 30.58% 24.96% 11.22% 2.29% 16.60% 
21-40 years old 
870 936 1,174 258 3,238 882 836 1,053 230 3,001 
26.87% 28.91% 36.26% 7.97% 100.00% 29.39% 27.86% 35.09% 7.66% 100.00% 
17.23% 18.45% 16.07% 4.41% 13.91% 16.07% 18.04% 14.92% 4.24% 13.28% 
41-60 years old 
846.000 927.000 1,559 739 4,071 1,027 851 1,459 635 3,972 
20.78% 22.77% 38.30% 18.15% 100.00% 25.86% 21.42% 36.73% 15.99% 100.00% 
16.75% 18.28% 21.34% 12.63% 17.49% 18.72% 18.36% 20.67% 11.72% 17.58% 
61-69 years old 
435 455.000 992 760 2,642 562 468 985 653 2,668 
16.46% 17.22% 37.55% 28.77% 100.00% 21.06% 17.54% 36.92% 24.48% 100.00% 
8.61% 8.97% 13.58% 12.99% 11.35% 10.24% 10.10% 13.96% 12.05% 11.81% 
70-79 years old 
470 634 1,168 1,327 3,599 607 572 1,231 1,208 3,618 
13.06% 17.62% 32.45% 36.87% 100.00% 16.78% 15.81% 34.02% 33.39% 100.00% 
9.31% 12.50% 15.99% 22.68% 15.46% 11.06% 12.34% 17.44% 22.29% 16.01% 
80-89 years old 
497 622 1,155 1,946 4,220 548 578 1,176 1,876 4,178 
11.78% 14.74% 27.37% 46.11% 100.00% 13.12% 13.83% 28.15% 44.90% 100.00% 
9.84% 12.26% 15.81% 33.26% 18.13% 9.99% 12.47% 16.66% 34.62% 18.49% 
90-112 years old 
180 232 348 719 1,479 183 173 362 693 1,411 
12.17% 15.69% 23.53% 48.61% 100.00% 12.97% 12.26% 25.66% 49.11% 100.00% 
3.56% 4.57% 4.76% 12.29% 6.35% 3.34% 3.73% 5.13% 12.79% 6.24% 
Total 
5,050 5,072 7,305 5,850 23,277 5,487 4,635 7,058 5,419 22,599 
21.70% 21.79% 31.38% 25.13% 100.00% 24.28% 20.51% 31.23% 23.98% 100.00% 
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
     =  4.6e+03   p = 0.000    =  4.1e+03   p = 0.000 
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Table 29: Bed nights by ACSC for ULHT. 
Patients with Ambulatory 
Care Sensitive Conditions 
Oct12-Feb13 Oct13-Feb14 
0 nights 1 night 2-6 nights 7-100 nights Total 0 nights 1 night 2-6 nights 7-100 nights Total 
No 
4,749 4,642 6,550 5,109 21,050 5,173 4,196 6,308 4,894 20,571 
22.56% 22.05% 31.12% 24.27% 100.00% 25.15% 20.40% 30.66% 23.79% 100.00% 
94.04% 91.52% 89.66% 87.33% 90.43% 94.28% 90.53% 89.37% 90.31% 91.03% 
Yes 
301 430 755 741 2,227 314 439 750 525 2,028 
13.52% 19.31% 33.90% 33.27% 100.00% 15.48% 21.65% 36.98% 25.89% 100.00% 
5.96% 8.48% 10.34% 12.67% 9.57% 5.72% 9.47% 10.63% 9.69% 8.97% 
Total 
5,050 5,072 7,305 5,850 23,277 5,487 4,635 7,058 5,419 22,599 
21.70% 21.79% 31.38% 25.13% 100.00% 24.28% 20.51% 31.23% 23.98% 100.00% 
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
     =   152.8237   p = 0.000    =  99.3858   p = 0.000 
 
Table 30: Bed nights by patients readmitted for ULHT. 
Patients readmitted 
Oct12-Feb13 Oct13-Feb14 
0 nights 1 night 2-6 nights 7-100 nights Total 0 nights 1 night 2-6 nights 7-100 nights Total 
No 
 
 
4,549 4,595 6,561 5,012 20,717 4,996 4,246 6,359 4,817 20,418 
21.96% 22.18% 31.67% 24.19% 100.00% 24.47% 20.80% 31.14% 23.59% 100.00% 
90.08% 90.60% 89.82% 85.68% 89.00% 91.05% 91.61% 90.10% 88.89% 90.35% 
Yes 
 
 
501 477 744 838 2,560 491 389 699 602 2,181 
19.57% 18.63% 29.06% 32.73% 100.00% 22.51% 17.84% 32.05% 27.60% 100.00% 
9.92% 9.40% 10.18% 14.32% 11.00% 8.95% 8.39% 9.90% 11.11% 9.65% 
Total 
 
 
5,050 5,072 7,305 5,850 23,277 5,487 4,635 7,058 5,419 22,599 
21.70% 21.79% 31.38% 25.13% 100.00% 24.28% 20.51% 31.23% 23.98% 100.00% 
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
     =   90.2222   p = 0.000    =   25.2522   p = 0.000 
  
 
 
 
Table 31: 0 and 1-100 bed nights for ULHT. 
Month Coefficient (SE) OR p-value 
Oct13-Feb14 -0.17 (0.02) 0.84 0.000 
20-40 years old 0.71 (0.04) 2.03 0.000 
41-60 years old 0.95 (0.03) 2.57 0.000 
61-69 years old 1.20 (0.04) 3.34 0.000 
70-79 years old 1.48 (0.04) 4.38 0.000 
80-89 years old 1.69 (0.04) 5.43 0.000 
90-112 years old 1.69 (0.06) 5.44 0.000 
ACSC 0.38 (0.05) 1.47 0.000 
Number of observations = 45,876 
McFadden's R2 = 0.062 
P=< 0.001 
 
7. A further logistic regression was carried out to evaluate in which months the bed-nights 
were reduced (table 32). This was a statistically significant model (p=<0.001), although, 
again, little variance in the model is being explained (6%). Of the months included, it can be 
seen that the month of December 2012 and the period November 2013 to February 2014 
demonstrate a statistically significant reduction in bed-nights. Again, older people and those 
with an ACSC are more likely to use a greater number of bed-nights. 
Table 32: 0 and 1-100 bed nights for ULHT by winter period months. 
Month Coefficient (SE) OR p-value 
Nov-12 -0.05 (0.05) 0.95 0.331 
Dec-12 -0.11 (0.05) 0.90 0.034 
Jan-13 -0.04 (0.05) 0.96 0.432 
Feb-13 0.05 (0.05) 1.05 0.326 
Oct-13 -0.04 (0.05) 0.96 0.489 
Nov-13 -0.12 (0.05) 0.89 0.027 
Dec-13 -0.26 (0.05) 0.77 0.000 
Jan-14 -0.27 (0.05) 0.76 0.000 
Feb-14 -0.32 (0.05) 0.73 0.000 
20-40 years old 0.71 (0.04) 2.03 0.000 
41-60 years old 0.95 (0.04) 2.58 0.000 
61-69 years old 1.21 (0.04) 3.34 0.000 
70-79 years old 1.48 (0.04) 4.39 0.000 
80-89 years old 1.70 (0.04) 5.45 0.000 
90-112 years old 1.70 (0.06) 5.45 0.000 
ACSC 0.38 (0.05) 1.47 0.000 
Number of observations = 45,876 
McFadden's R2 = 0.063 
P= < 0.001 
  
________________________________________________________________________________55 
 
 
8. A final logistical regression was carried out to evaluate 0 and 1 bed-nights (table 33). Of the 
months included, it can be seen that the months of December 2012 and November 2013 to 
February 2014 demonstrate a statistically significant reduction in bed-nights. Again, the 
older the patient, the more likely they are to experience a single bed-night, whilst those 
patients with ASCS conditions are 1.5 times more likely to be admitted for one bed-night. 
Table 33: 0 and 1 bed nights for ULHT by winter period months 
Month Coefficient (SE) OR p-value 
Nov-12 -0.12 (0.06) 0.89 0.051 
Dec-12 -0.17 (0.06) 0.84 0.007 
Jan-13 -0.08 (0.06) 0.92 0.190 
Feb-13 -0.06 (0.06) 0.94 0.334 
Oct-13 -0.07 (0.06) 0.94 0.292 
Nov-13 -0.22 (0.06) 0.80 0.000 
Dec-13 -0.31 (0.06) 0.73 0.000 
Jan-14 -0.38 (0.06) 0.68 0.000 
Feb-14 -0.35 (0.06) 0.71 0.000 
20-40 years old 0.37 (0.04) 1.45 0.000 
41-60 years old 0.29 (0.04) 1.33 0.000 
61-69 years old 0.24 (0.05) 1.28 0.000 
70-79 years old 0.43 (0.05) 1.54 0.000 
80-89 years old 0.46 (0.05) 1.59 0.000 
90-112 years old 0.45 (0.08) 1.57 0.000 
ACSC 0.41 (0.06) 1.51 0.000 
Number of observations = 20,244 
McFadden's R2 = 0.011  
p =< 0.001 
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IMPACT OF THE ADMISSION AVOIDANCE PROGRAMME 
 
The overall focus of this evaluation has been to address the following key questions:  
1. Does the scheme contribute to discernible, (real and tangible) quantifiable reduction in 
acute emergency admissions? 
2. Does the scheme represent value for money when benchmarked against the cost of an acute 
admission? 
The following sections summarise our findings. 
QUANTIFIABLE REDUCTIONS IN EMERGENCY ADMISSIONS? 
From the analysis above, we found no demonstrable changes in the monthly emergency admissions 
for ULHT. Quantifiable reductions were found across two other measures; numbers of bed-nights 
and zero lengths of stay. In the second of the two winter periods, the numbers of bed-nights were 
significantly reduced. The months of December 2012 and the period November 2013 to February 
2014 showed statistically significant reductions. In the latter time-period, only 20 winter expansion 
beds were opened. In comparison, in the same period last year (October 2012 – February 2013) over 
100 winter expansion beds were necessary. A statistically significant change was found in zero bed-
nights, increasing from 5,050 to 5,487 in the second winter period. This nine percent increase was 
found to be statistically significant when explored alongside age ranges. 
 
VALUE FOR MONEY? 
The short-term nature of this evaluation has not enabled a full cost-effectiveness analysis to be 
undertaken. The data presented can only explore the cost per patient (or referral) of each service. 
We are unable to make estimations as to the wider cost to the health and social care economy. For 
example, 58 per cent of those patients treated by the Rapid Response Teams were referred onto 
other community-based services. Further services are likely to be necessary if the patient is to be 
appropriately supported, e.g., reablement, rehabilitation, adult social care package. As patients were 
not followed (or ‘tracked’) as part of this evaluation, we are unable to report these costs.  
 
The resources would seem to demonstrate value for money when benchmarked against the cost of 
an acute admission. The per annum unit costs of calls to the Contact Centre is £67 whilst the total 
annual cost per patient referred to the Rapid Response team may be as low as £264. The unit cost 
for treating patients at the Ambulatory Emergency Care Units is almost half the cost of a bed-day; 
£197.  
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A CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP? 
The key question is; can the changes in bed-nights and zero lengths of stay be linked to the activity 
of the admission avoidance programme? We would argue that despite the high-quality care being 
provided in the community, no causal linkage can be demonstrated. These finding are more likely to 
be the result of system-wide changes. However, they may indicate a positive ‘direction of travel’; 
‘I’ve been here for 12 years and I don’t know what they are doing, but it’s the easiest winter I’ve had’ 
(CDU nurse at PHB). In particular, the changes in the zero lengths of stay may not have been seen 
without the implementation of the Ambulatory Emergency Care units. However, to fully understand 
if change has taken place a far more rigorous ‘before and after’ evaluation would need to be 
undertaken; using a quasi-experimental or randomised (e.g., case-control) research model.  
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SECONDARY ANALYSIS: HIPS AND PACT EVALUTIONS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
As part of the overall evaluation, a critical analysis was to be carried out of the internal evaluations 
generated by the Hospital Intensive Psychiatric Service (HIPS) and the Prevention of Admission 
Community Team Service (PACT). Interviews were initially carried out with senior management and 
strategic staff. Following our evaluation proposal, we then ‘assessed if a secondary analysis of 
existing documentation (e.g., case studies), qualitative or quantitative data would improve findings 
and recommendations’ (Admission Avoidance Programme: Proposed Evaluation, March 2013). 
During this time, the commissioner-led decision was made that neither service would be continued. 
However, from a critical reading of both evaluations and the HIPS economic impact evaluation, it 
had been decided that no further analysis could be appropriately undertaken. The services provided 
were necessarily unable to be developed as a randomised or case-controlled trial. Base-line data was 
not collected or included and as we will discuss, little evidence was seemingly presented that was 
able to explain assumptions around outcomes, e.g., reduction in admissions, lengths of stay.  
 
Any further analyses in the time-frame of our evaluation, (eight weeks), would not be able to 
appropriately support or refute the findings presented. In the following sections, we present existing 
evidence drawn from the literature and ‘flag’ those findings that may benefit from further discussion 
or analysis.  
 
HOSPITAL INTENSIVE PSYCHIATRIC SERVICE: HIPS 
The HIP service was funded through ‘Winter Pressures’ monies, managed by LPFT and implemented 
in Lincoln County Hospital from 1 July 2013. As the ‘HIPS Impact Report’ (March 2014) details, the 
team consisted of Band 6 senior mental health nurses (the number is unspecified), a drug and 
alcohol specialist nurse, a Consultant Psychiatrist, Speciality doctor and Consultant Clinical 
Psychologist. A 24 hour, seven day a week service was provided, working across the A&E department 
and all wards. 
 
EVIDENCE FROM THE LITERATURE 
A range of psychiatric liaison models (e.g., multidisciplinary teams, nurse-led liaison services, A&E 
led) have been included in meta-analyses, systematic reviews, randomised controlled trials and 
reported in evaluative studies. A recent systematic review (Holmes et al., 2010) argued that that 
evidence about the effectiveness of liaison services is limited and much of its methodology is weak. 
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Identifying and analysing findings from 108 studies, it was found that liaison services would only 
seem to have the potential to be more effective at improving outcomes in older people (Draper 
2000, Draper and Low 2005, Andreoli et al., 2003). 
 
The most positive outcome found was that of increased staff and patient satisfaction (Anderson et 
al., 2008; Hughes et al., 2008; Atkinson et al., 2012). In two randomised –controlled studies, no 
effect was found on hospital lengths of stay, rates of rehospitalisation or change in mental health 
status (Baldwin et al., 2004; Cullum et al., 2007). A number of evaluative studies did report that the 
implementation of a liaison service resulted in: reductions in lengths of stay in specific populations; 
the facilitation of effective discharge (Mukaetova-Ladinska et al., 2011); and that diagnoses 
improved with a liaison service person present. But there were considerable differences between 
the models evaluated and the rigour of the evaluations (Holmes et al., 2010). 
 
In contrast, the randomised controlled trial of the RAID model, a multi-disciplinary Psychiatric Liaison 
Service, seemingly resulted in reductions of hospital lengths of stay (Parsonage and Fossey 2011). On 
average, these were reduced by slightly less than one day (0.9) in the RAID sub-group analysed. For 
the RAID-influence sub-group, the corresponding difference was 3.2 days. This latter group included 
patients who had been supported at ‘one-remove’. That is, the RAID team had provided a range of 
support to ward staff, enabling them to better manage patients with mental health problems. 
However, when reporting this figure, it must be noted that such changes were only found in a small 
number of ‘matched’ patients. As Parsonage and Fossey (2011) explain, owing to the differences 
between the intervention and control groups, only a proportion of the patients could be ‘matched’. 
The sub-samples were therefore relative small; 79 for the RAID sub-group and 359 for the RAID-
influence sub-group. In reporting total saved bed-days, the authors then extrapolate this reduction 
in lengths of stay to their full sample; estimating the total number of bed-days saved at 9,290 over 
the 8-month study period, equivalent to 13,935 bed-days in a full year (Parsonage and Fossey, 2010: 
10).  
 
However, care has to be taken in interpreting and applying this figure to other psychiatric liaison 
services. The significant reduction was only found for the small group of ‘matched’ patients. 
Similarly, the authors present no data that, for example, accounts for the ‘normal’ variation found in 
lengths of stay across different age ranges or, that changes found may be confounded by hospital 
conventions of discharge. 
 
THE HIPS EVALUATION AND ECONOMIC CASE 
A total of 2,291 referrals were received, resulting in 4,404 contacts across the time-period of 
operation (July 2013 to February 2014). The authors state that ‘of those patients seen in A&E by HIPS 
an average of 89% have been diverted and not admitted into Lincoln County Hospital’ (p8). The total 
________________________________________________________________________________65 
 
number of referrals from A&E is 939. If this raw figure is taken, the number of actual emergency 
admissions avoided is 836. There is no discussion on how this proportion of diverted admissions has 
been estimated. In presenting the data, the authors may have been applying their clinical knowledge 
as to the likely counter-factual outcome. That is, they were able to discuss specific cases with 
colleagues, identifying that without the HIP service; those particular patients would have been 
admitted. The evaluation may have been stronger if this information had been included in the 
report. Similarly, questions are raised around the reported number of diverted admissions, as no 
overarching change in emergency admissions has been found (see Secondary quantitative analysis). 
However, such small numbers may not have been appropriately demonstrated in our statistical 
process control analysis.  
 
The HIPS team achieved their 24 hour target response to wards in an average of 72 per cent of 
cases; recognising that there were three months when this fell below 55 per cent. It was not 
surprising to find that two of those three months were in January and February 2014. At this stage in 
the implementation of the service, the uncertainty as to availability of continued funding was 
becoming acute. Team members were leaving to take up non-time limited contracts and owing to 
the cessation of further funding, LPFT were unable to recruit further staff. At this stage, it was 
reported that the HIPS staffing was so low, the team were unable to appropriately manage and meet 
referrals or targets (Interviews 14, 17 and 22). However, this lack of capacity was not appropriately 
recognised in the evaluation. It could be argued that if only 46 per cent of cases were seen within 
the 24 hour target in January 2014; the remaining patients (54%) may have had their discharges 
delayed whilst they were waiting more than one day for an appropriate assessment. It may have 
been that there were no delayed discharges as a result of missing the 24 hour target. However, such 
concerns could have been addressed in the report, estimating the number of delayed discharges (if 
any) and the impact these may have had on any economic evaluation (i.e., the total bed-day cost 
may have increased during these time-frames).  
 
The HIPS economic evaluation applied the RAID model in extrapolating their likely non-cashable 
acute savings. No discussion was held that their model of provision differed (i.e., no social worker 
was present in the team); their care was not part of a controlled trial; nor was there any recognition 
that the findings from the RAID model were limited to a small sub-set of appropriately ‘matched’ 
patients. Similarly, mirroring our evaluation, no costs could be provided of any consequent 
secondary or community treatment, e.g., readmissions, community mental health support or adult 
social care plan. In consequence, it may be that the ‘positive economic impact of between 
£1,452,420 and £4,660,000 projected over a 12 month period’ (Economic Impact: Evaluation:1), 
would benefit from further in-depth analysis. A simple analysis using the raw figures of those 
patients diverted from A&E and MEAU, (1,067), would result in non-cashable savings of £373,450, 
assuming the conservative saving of a single bed-day at £350.  
 
The HIPS service would seem to have been welcomed by staff and patients, with high quality 
assessments provided. In flagging up some of the difficulties with the evaluation report, we are not 
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negating such positive activity. Nevertheless, the evaluation is necessarily limited. It lacks base-line 
data and demonstrable evidence as to the numbers of patients for whom admissions were avoided. 
In particular, the use of the RAID model to extrapolate potential savings was not adequately argued 
or supported. 
 
THE PACT EVALUATION 
The PACT service was set up in January 2013 to provide supported discharge; transporting patients 
from hospital to home and helping the patient to settle following hospital discharge. The service was 
initially funded through LPFT and focused toward those older patients, aged 65 and over with mental 
health problems needing transport from Lincoln County Hospital. Following initially low 
transportation requests, the service was extended to include all patients requiring transportation. In 
December 2013, the same service was provided in Pilgrim and Grantham Hospitals. 
 
EVIDENCE FROM THE LITERATURE 
A rapid review found no studies that explored the impact of patient transportation on avoided 
admissions. Transport that can support attendance at health appointments would seem to be a 
necessary resource (Greaves and Rogers-Clark 2009; Stephens et al., 2013). However, only one paper 
identified the impact of a lack of transport and this focused upon delayed discharges. It was 
reported that patient transport caused delays to discharge in in 1.4 per cent of cases (Hendry et al., 
2012).  
 
THE PACT EVALUATION 
The design of the PACT evaluation was necessarily limited. No base-line data was used; there was no 
‘before’ and ‘after’ measurement (case-control study); nor could there be an attempt to control for 
the counter-factual, (i.e., what would have happened without the PACT service), through 
randomising patients to either transport by PACT or ‘usual care’. In particular, no figures were 
produced that estimated the number of emergency admissions that had previously resulted from a 
lack of transport. Rather, in assessing the number of ‘avoided admissions’, the PACT evaluation 
made a number of assumptions. 
 
The number of avoided admissions identified in the evaluation, was based on two factors. The first 
measure used was the department or ward from which the patient was being transported; whilst 
the second was the day the patient used the PACT service. For example, if the patient was being 
transported from A&E, an assumption was made that unless PACT had been available, all 236 
transported patients would have been admitted for at least one night. Similarly, if such patients 
were transported by PACT on a Friday, a further three bed-days were avoided; assuming discharge 
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would not have taken place until at least Monday. In applying these assumptions, the evaluators 
stated a total of 1,102 admissions were avoided, saving 3,271 bed-nights. Using these data, an 
economic case was built that put the total cost of saved bed-nights (at £350 per bed-night) at 
£1,144,850. 
 
No evidence was presented that those patients transported would have been admitted for either 
one or more bed-nights. There are a huge number of variables that affect admission, not least 
clinical assessment and diagnostics. Similarly, there are concerns around the inclusion of certain 
departments or wards in estimating ‘avoided admissions’. For example, the evaluation assumes that 
the 22 patients transported from the ‘Discharge Lounge’, would have been readmitted without the 
intervention of PACT. As each of these patients have been assessed as ‘medically fit for discharge’, 
transported to the discharge lounge and (no doubt) their bed taken by another patient; it would 
seem unlikely that all would have been readmitted should PACT not have been available.  
 
The estimated figure of 3,272 ‘bed-nights saved’ does not seem to be supported by existing hospital 
data. For example, if the monthly A&E situation reports for ULHT1  are explored, 40 per cent of those 
attending A&E are admitted. As we have discussed above, the evaluation assumes that all 236 
patients transported from A&E would have been admitted, rather than perhaps the more 
conservative figure of 94 patients. Similarly, as we have argued previously in this report, we found 
no change in the number of emergency admissions.  
 
The literature demonstrated that 1.4 per cent of discharges from an acute admissions unit were 
delayed because of a lack of transport (Hendy et al., 2012). The number of delayed discharges across 
ULHT between February 2013 and March 2014 was 8,218 (where the delayed transfer of care was 
the responsibility of the NHS). This leads to the assumption that a total of 115 admissions were 
delayed owing to a lack of transport. It is more likely that PACT was able to produce non-cashable 
acute savings in transporting these patients. Assuming the maximum of three bed-nights were saved 
in each instance (at £350 per bed-night), the total non-cashable saving would be £120,750. 
 
COSTS OF THE PACT SERVICE 
The total cost of PACT (including set-up costs) across the 14 months of operation (January 2013 – 
February 2014) was £883,203. A total of 2,262 patients were transported at a cost of £390 per 
patient. Such costings do include set-up costs. If we assume 30 per cent set-up costs in the first year 
(e.g., see Jones et al 2011), the total cost is £290 per patient ((1yr costs = 757,020; 30% set up costs 
                                                          
1
 http://www.england.nhs.uk/statistics/statistical-work-areas/ae-waiting-times-and-activity/weekly-ae-sitreps-
2013-14/ 
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= £227,106, direct patient costs = £529,914 + two further months of operation (£63,085 per month) 
= £656,084/2,263 = £289.91)).  
 
COMPARATIVE COSTS –‘HOSPITAL TO HOME’  
 
That the PACT service provided high-quality care is not in question. However, it may be useful to 
explore the cost-per patient by comparing this with other service provision. For example a similar 
‘Hospital to Home’ service was set up as part of the Older People’s Partnership Programme (Windle 
et al., 2009). This project was run in partnership with a number of local voluntary organisations and 
aimed to facilitate timely, safe and efficient hospital discharge. It consisted of one ‘whole-time 
equivalent’ co-ordinator and a small pool of part-time support staff. The project provided practical 
support by preparing the house prior to discharge; transportation home; settling the patient at 
home and a number of follow-up phone calls and/ or visits. At the initial transportation, a home 
safety check was carried out and concerns were referred to the appropriate agency. This project 
differed from the PACT service through maintaining contact with the patient across a six week time 
frame. On-going cleaning and personal tasks were provided by the part-time support staff. The total 
cost of this project (April 2007 – March 2009) was £133,130. Accounting for inflation (at 3% per 
annum) this project would now cost £149,105. A total of 740 patients used the service, with an 
average (mean) two visits to each patient being carried out. The total cost of this service was £100 
per patient. 
 
 
